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not be enough. He must form a definite wish. And secondly, wishing that his wishes should not be gratified should only be gratified until he made a positive wish. The instant he did that the satisfaction should come. I do not think that consciousness herself could have the face to pronounce this state of things good. The only alleviation of it would be the state of imbecillity in which the person would be engullfed. Now I ask, whether, in view of this, the mere satisfaction of an impulse can be said to be per se a good, at all. Under certain circumstances the satisfaction may be good, no doubt, but is it so per se and simpliciter? Here again, we find ourselves contemplating aan absurdity. A satisfaction cannot be divorced from its circumstances. It results then that the gratification of an instinct is not per se any part of the good. Still, it might be said that