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thought. It consists in taking a feature of a percept or percepts, after it has already been prescinded from the other elements of the percept, so as to take propositional form in a judgment, (indeed, it may operate upon any judgment whatsoever) and in conceiving this fact to consist in the relation between the subject of that judgment and another subject which has a mode of being that merely consists in the truth of propositions of which the corresponding concrete term is the predicate. Thus, we transform the proposition, 'Honey is sweet' into 'honey possesses sweetness'. 'Sweetness might be called a firtititious thing in one sense. But since the mode of being attributed to it consists in no more han the fact that some things are sweet, and it is not pritended, or even imagined, that it has any other mode of being, there is, after all, no fiction. The only profession made is that me, can consider the fact of honey being sweet under the form of a relation; and so we really can. I have,