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34

But both these premisses are false.
Even if our reasonings were all determined by a feeling of logicality, still so long as we were able to compare them with norms based on the consideration of the relation of our thoughts to facts, in case the norms were not satisfied our feeling of logicality would instantly be reversed.
In no way could the distinction of good and bad reasoning be destroyed short of destroying the power of comparing it, after it was made with such norms.
The truth is that the defendents confound the judgment of satisfaction or dissactisfaction of the norms which is made subsequent to act of inference with a feeling accompaying that act.

The first premiss is still more manifestly false.
Nothing can be more monstrous than to say that it is unthinkable that a reasoning shoud be based on anything but a feeling of logicality which

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