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relation of identity to some B, it follows that the logical
impossibility lies in some existential limitation of the As.
However, dropping at the outset the assumption about the
one to one relation considering any two gaths, the As and the Bs,
there is a relation in which no relate
stands to two different correlates (though two relates
may stand in it to the same correlate) in which
every B stands to an A; for the Bs may so stand
to any one A. Now setting out with such a
relation, let us ask whether by a change of it so as to change
each correlate into some other individual of the
universe, it is possible so to change it as to make
every A a correlate of it. Let us trace out the
consequences of supposing this not to be possible. Let us
under this hypothesis change our relation by a
change of correlates so as to render it a one to one
relation, and let us suppose this to be done in every possible