149

I undertake to demonstrate mathematically that the
validity of induction, in the proper sense of the term,
that is to say, experimental reasoning, follows through the
laminas of probabilities, from the nidi-
ments of the doctrines of necessary consequences, without
any assumption whatever about the future being like
the past, or similar results following similar condi-
tions, or the uniformity of nature, or any such
vague principle. I shall set forth the reasoning in
strict accuracy of form; and I defy any-
body to find a flaw in it. The importance of the question
for every man is tremendous. Having fully set forth
my doctrine of induction, with the very strict rules
to [lend?] it down which are necessitated by the demonstration
mentioned, I pass by for the present the
consideration of all other theories, and proceed at
once to the study of Abduction. Upon this subject,