9

Logic
IV 9
you will say, "whether the aim which logic has is vein is a good one, or not; as a matter of fact, we are interested in it. It is to learn the truth: no aim could be of more elementary simplicity. Let us turn to where we are told how to come to it. " Well, if this aim is so readily comprehensible, suppose you tell me, to whom it does not seem so, what truth consists in. "Truther is the conformity of a representation to its object," say Kant. One might make this statement more explicit; but for our present purpose it may pass. It is nearly correct, so far as it is intelligible. Only what is that "object" which serves to define truth? Why it is the reality: it is of such a naure as to be independent of representations of it, so that, taking any individual sign or any individual collection of signs (such, for example, as all the ideas that ever enter into a given man's head,) there is some character which that thing