EN155
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2 revisions | Michael.Seidel at Mar 12, 2021 01:43 AM | |
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155Logic IV. 161 the Good will be the transfusion of divinity through our whole soul. The implication is that nothing else is either desireable or even deliberately desired. It would have been in place to consider what truth there may be, in such an assumption. Plato proceeds otherwise. He maintains that things most contrary to one another are included under the name of pleasure; and when it is insisted that pleasure is nevertheless one in all cases, he replies that this is pyaing no regard to facts; although it is manifestly he himself who is refusing to use his perceptive powers. [He?] says that pleasure is like color and figure, in respect to this that it includes feelings very different from one another. Whether this is as true of please as it is of color, or not, it is certain that all colors have one sort of feeling in common. An art which teaches to dispute that sort of thing is an art of which a scientific man would [earnestly?] pray that height be delivered from possessing the smallest smattering. Instead of honestly admitting a plain | 155 |