40

35

is a part of it.
How can an act be caused by a feeling which does not exist until the act exists?
Or who ever reasons "This seems to me true and therefore it must be true."
Yet even this is not adopting the reasoning becasue that very reasoning seems sound.
That is a thinf too absurd to be formulated in words.
The only thing without which it is unthinkable that reasoning should take place is a determination of one's nature causing it.
But the defendents confound this with that feeling in the act which they also confound with the judgment of satisfaction of the norm.

Besides this principle fault of the defendent argument, there is another that I cannot pass over.
When it is said that all unference "assumes that what seems to be giid reasoning is so", there is an inaccuracy of expression.
For an inference assumes nothing but its premisses.
But if we understand this to mean that no reason be sound unless