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as having had no beginning then when
we make general assertions concerning
it, we can only be talking of it as an object
of possible experience, that is, of what
future researches may bring to
light. Hence it might be inferred that the contrast
Aristotle speaks of between the past and the future
might be merely subjective, having to do with our different
attitude toward them. But even a moderate appreciation
of the Kantian argument will show that
besides being true in regard to our knowledge of time,
it must also be regarded as true of real time; and
time is real, whether we accept Kant's dubious view
of it which he is certainly far from making evident
as the form of the internal sense, or not.
I do not question Time's being a form, that is, being

56

as having had no beginning then when we make general assertions concerning it, we can only be talking of it as an object of possible experience, that is of what future researches may bring to light.
Hence it might be inferred that the contrast Aristotle speaks of between the past and the future might be merely subjective, having to do without different attitude towards them.
But even a moderate appreciation of the Kantian argument will show that besides being true in regard to our knowledge of time, it must also be regarded as true in [u]real time[/u]; and time [u]is[/u] real whether we accept Kant's dubious view of it which he is certainly far from making evident as the form of the internal sense or not.
I do not question Time's being a [u]form[/u], that is, being