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of a state of things describable in a different
general statement,— and this latter general
statement constitutes the conclusion. To show
that this really is a correct description of
Deduction, it will suffice to consider the general
structure of Euclid's demonstrations,— Euclid's
being more formally correct in statement
than modern mathematicians think is
needful. He invariably begins
with a general statement of what he
intends to prove. This is called the proposition;
in Greek πρότασις, that is the pretension, or preliminary
statement. In Aristotle it means a premiss.
He then restates the condition of his proposition in such a form
as to assign a selective or proper name to

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of a state of things describable in a different general statement,- and this latter general statement constitutes the conclusion.
To show that this really is a correct description of Deduction, it will suffice to consider the general structure of Euclid's demonstrations,- Euclid's being more formally correct in statement that ardent mathematicians think is needful.
He invariably begins with a general statement of what he intends to prove.
This is called the provosition; in Greek [], that is the pretension, or preliminary statement.
In Aristotle it means a premiss.
He then restates the condition of his proposition in such a form as to assign a selective or proper name to