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discrimination in the exercise of that right on account of
race etc., is. The right to vote in the States comes from
the States; but the right of exemption from the prohibited
discrimination comes from the United States. The first has
not been granted or secured by the Constitution of the
United States; but the last has been.

Inasmuch therefore, as it does not appear in these
counts that the intent of the defendants was to prevent
these parties from exercising their right to vote on account
of their race etc., it does not appear that it was their in-
tent to interfere with any right granted or secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.

And that the Judges of the Supreme Court who render-
ed the Ex Parte Yarbrough decision of 1884, intended to de-
cide in it, "that the right to vote for Presidential Elect- ions ors
and members of Congress was secured to citizens of the
United States by the Federal Constitution, is evident from
the fact that Mr. Justice Gray of that court has declared
that they did, by using the following words in the case of
In Re Quarles and David Butler of 1895:— "Among the
rights and privileges which has been recognized by this
Court to be secured to citizens of the United States by the
Constitution, are the right to petition Congress for a redress
of grievances U. S. vs. Cruikshank 82 U. S. 583, 582 (23:
588, 591), and the right to vote for Presidential Elect ions ors and
members of Congress Ex Parte Yarbrough 110 U. S. 651
(88. 274)."

The Supreme Court affirmed in U S. vs. Reese of 1876,
that the 15th, Amendment did not confer a "right to vote"
at state elections upon the citizens of the United States,
but a "new right" which was a "right of exemption" from
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.

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That Congress could protect citizens in exercising this
new right by making laws which contained the words race,
color or previous condition of servitude so as to confine
their protection within the limits required by the 15th,
Amendment. Because this new right was derived from this
Amendment, and Congress had a constitutional power to
make laws for the protection of citizens in exercising such
rights as were "created by or dependent upon the constitu-
tion of the United States." And that the form and manner
of protection might be such as Congresss in the legitimate
exercise of its legislative discretion should provide.

But the Supreme Court indirectly affirmed in this U. S.
vs. Reese decision of 1876, that there was nothing in the
Constitution of the United States that authorized Congress
to make federal laws which protected citizens in exercising
a "right to vote" at State elections, by first declaring in this
decision that the 15th Amendment had not conferred upon
citizens a "right to vote" at State elections, but a "right of
exemption" from discrimination in the exercise of the elec-
tive franchise on account of race color or previous condition
of servitude," and then saving in it: "The power of Con-
gress to legislate at all upon the subject of voting at State
elections rests upon this Amendment."

And when we entreated Senator Manderson and other
leading Congressmen to protect women against State denial
of the right of citizens of the United States to vote for
members of Congress with the power that had been con-
ferred upon them by the l4th Amendment of our Federal
Constitution, and these gentlemen complied with our en-
treaty in so far as to have Senator Manderson introduce a
bill in the United States Senate for the above mentioned
purpose on February 18th, 1889, the bill did not authorize
women to vote at State elections.

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