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452 LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS

"This sentiment originated, very naturally, in the circumstances in which
Haïti began her national existence. The whole Christian world was at that
time against her. The Caribbean Sea was studded with communities hostile
to her. They were slaveholding. She, by her bravery, and her blood, was free.
Her existence was, therefore, a menace to them, and theirs Was a menace to
her. France, England, Spain, Portugal, and Holland, as well as the United
States, were wedded to the slave system which Haïti had, by arms, thrown
off; and hence she was regarded as an outcast, and was outlawed by the
Christian world. Though time and events have gone far to change this rela-
tion of hers to the outside world, the sentiment that originated in the begin-
ning of her existence continues, on both sides, until this day. It was this that
stood like a wall of granite against our success. Other causes cooperated, but
this was the principal cause. Of course our peculiar and intense prejudice
against the colored race was not forgotten. Our contrast to other nations, in
this respect, is often dwelt upon in Haïti to our disadvantage. In no part of
Europe will a Haïti be insulted because of his color, and Haïtiens well
know that this is not the case in the United States.

"Another influence unfavorable to our obtaining the co\eted naval sta-
tion at the Môle was the tone of the New York press on the subject. It more
than hinted that, once in possession of the Môle, the United States would
control the destiny of Haïti. Torn and rent by revolution as she has been and
still is, Haïti yet has a large share of national pride, and scorns the idea that
she needs or will submit to, the rule of a foreign power. Some of her citizens
would doubtless be glad of American rule, but the overwhelming majority
would burn their towns and freely shed their blood over their ashes to pre-
vent such a consummation.

"Not the least, perhaps. among the collateral causes of our non-success
was the minatory attitude assumed by us while conducting the negotiation.
What wisdom was there in confronting Haïti at such a moment with a squad-
ron of large ships of war with a hundred cannon and two thousand men? This
was done, and it was naturally construed into a hint to Haïti that if we could
not, by appeals to reason and friendly feeling, obtain what we wanted, we
could obtain it by a show of force. We appeared before the Haïtiens, and
before the world, with the pen in one hand and the sword in the other. This
was not a friendly and considerate attitude for a great government like ours
to assume when asking a concession from a small and weak nation like Haïti.
It was ill-timed, and out of all proportion to the demands of the occasion. It
was also done under a total misapprehension of the character of the people
with whom we had to deal. We should have known that, whatever else the