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LEGAL HEARINGS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ORGANIC LAWS.
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SIR:—Since my letter inserted in your paper No. 396 was written, in July 1855, some transactions occurred that seem to bespeak a collision of jurisdiction between the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern division of Pennsylvania and the State Courts, which, however, cannot happen, for the Common Law of equal rights is the Supreme Law of this Union, and is so affirmed by the U.S. Constitution and the Organic Laws.—Here every citizen is a sovereign, and cannot be placed in duress by the arbitrary will or dictum of any other person. Here, also, as in England, Judges are liable to be punished.
When a Judge or other public functionary loses sight of his oath of office, (Const. Sec. 6,) and commits any breach of the law, whether in our of his office, he loses the shield of the office and all claim to the protection of his former position, and becomes more amenable to the ordinary Common Law process and punishment for his guilt than any other culprit. Such was the Common Law position of the Earl of Ferrars in England, who claimed the protection of the privileges of his Peerage in the High Court of Parliament, which privilege he had forfeited by committing murder, for which he was tried at Newgate in London, as any other criminal, found guilty by the jury, and executed by the Common Hangman. The Earl of Clarendon, Lord High Chancellor of England, for an illegal transaction in office, (such as are done every day in the Courts of these United States,) was executed on Tower Hill, in London, as his great predecessor, Sir Thomas More, had been before that time for malpractice as Lord Chancellor. and later, under the administration of George the 4th, four officers of police, thentofore of high reputation, were hanged at Newgate, having been convicted on trial of contriving to procure the unlawfully conviction of innocent persons for alledged crimes.
In the United States judges and officers are equally amenable for their malfeasances as those in England; the law is the same, and the Judge who commits any crime cannot escape from the local Courts, (Add. Art. 6-7,) nor plead conflicting jurisdiction to get himself excused from the action of the Common Law Courts by his colleagues perhaps as guilty as himself. Hey may be pursued by Common Law process at once, in the first instance, although it is true that he may be impeached and found guilty of the offence charged. "But the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law." (Art. 1, Sec. 3, Cl. 7.)
During a large portion of the existence of American Independence, the State and Federal Governments and Legislatures, the Courts and public officers have fallen into the control of interested parties and cliques who have transcended the lawful authorities confided to them by the people—who must be vigilant to prevent the utter loss of individual freedom and public liberty which are jeopardized.
Though our revolution put an end to arbitrary punishments (Ad. Art. 8) and imprisonments for indefinite periods, and to treason, here: constructive treason was not abolish in "oppressive old England" until 1794, when that nefarious invention of villainous time-serving lawyers was attempted to be enforced by corrupt Judges who essayed, "a la Jeffries," to take the lives of the celebrated John Horn Tooke, Thomas Hardy, and other politicians who had combined with a view to procure the due execution of the laws of their country which were treacherously supervened (as our fundamental laws in the United States are) by corrupt administrators. Under the defence made by Thomas Erskine, afterwards Lord Chancellor of England, the juries, more honest than the Supreme Court, acquitted all the 135 prisoners intended to have been sacrificed, and the Attorney General, Sir John Scott, (afterwards Earl of Eldon and Lord High Chancellor,) pronounced that "constructive treason (by that verdict) was abolished for ever in England!"
Political villains in the United States took up the doctrine of constructive treason as an engine by which tyranically to torment our honest and really law-abiding citizens! Their efforts proved abortive—through the honest verdict of jurors in teh trials of the accused persons—who, nevertheless were ruined by the costs of their successful defence.
The doctrine of constructive treason having failed them, the slaveocrat Judges have introduced here the old exploded "Star Chamber" usurpation of a power (proscribed by the U. S. Constitution) to commit indefinitely, without trial, and without legal offence, for what they call "Contempt of Court." For this proceeding the United States Courts have no authority whatsoever, notwithstanding they have obtained three colorable acts of Congress to apparently patch up this deficiency of jurisdiction. Congress does not possess authority to pass such an act or grant such a power to punish without previous Common Law trial.
Contempt of Court is an ancient Common Law process to maintain order and decorum in Courts; it prevails in England only, and is inherent in the Court of Chancery, the Common Pleas, and the Supreme Court of Common Law. Its use here, however, is strictly prohibited by the Federal Constitution; and the offender, by misconduct in Court, must, for such misdemeanor, be sent as an accused person before a Committing Magistrate for examination, committal or bail, and the finding of a Grand Jury by Bill, and trial by Jury, for the misdemeanor charged. (Add. Art. 4 to 10.) In any other way, the habeas corpus (Art. 1, Sec. 9, Cl. 2) must release him. The Judges of Pennsylvania are subject to a penalty of three hundred pounds currency for every time that he or they refuse that write, and to the action for personal danger by the party aggrieved.
The Constitution has provided for the security of the inalienable rights of persons in Art. 3, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, and other parts, as Art. 6, (one of the most important,) and in the Additional Articles 4 to 10. Those articles proscribe the Congress itself, which has no authority to commit for contempt, as the British Parliament do at the will of either house. Our Congress can only "punish its own members for disorderly behavior:" (Art. 1, Sec. 5, Cl. 2;) its authority extends no further. It cannot delegate authority that is not granted to itself, and the officers appointed by Congress are alike limited by the Constitution and Additional Articles.
Neither the United States Congress nor any State Legislature possesses authority to confer on any body or Court, authority to commit summarily for contempt or any other cause; nor to proceed in any other way than by process and trial by jury, according to the rules of the Common Law of equal rights in common. No person can be imprisoned at the will of another person or persons by summary process, no matter what the office of the autocrat or committing part. General warrants and indefinite imprisonments and punishments without trial by jury for alledged offences, cannot be made legal in these United States.
This extra illegal usurpation of judicial power pretended to be conveyed to the United States Courts by the three colorable acts of Congress, before mentioned, is attempted to be defended under the Constitution, Art. 1, SEc. 8, Cl. 18, which says, "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constituion, in the Government or office thereof." But this power is only to make lawful laws, and is strictly limited by the Additional Articles 4 to 8, and further restricted to the objects specifically set forth in express words, by the Add. Art. 9 and 10, which proscribe the Congress from all such powers as have been usurped on in this and various other cases.
"The judicial power," appointed by, and under Art. 3, is equally limited and proscribed by the Additional Articles as the Congress is, and is, perhaps, as little observant of their obligations given under the 6th Article; and hence, the numerous invasions made upon the rights of persons, to favor the merely incidental rights of property in cases where, in fact and in law, no property exists nor can have legal existence in this Union.
Our beautiful Organic Laws—the aggregated wisdom of countless ages of mankind bygone—have been set at naught and substituted by the doctrine of expediency for the acquisition of wealth by illegal means, and the glorious rights of persons—our birth rights—are now extinguished by political villainy and avarice; and the "death of liberty" is proclaimed instead of that truly American motto of our predecessors, "death or liberty!" to enable treacherous administrators to secure to themselves their plunder from the abused people, obtained under breach of oaths and the false pretence of State rights—which rights they sacrifice in the name of "protection of property," which is a mere in- incident to personal liberty and individual freedom, and thus nullify the Republican principle of the "sovereignty of the people"—the primary object of all civilized society and of our State and Federal Constitutions and Organic Laws.
Respectfully,
AN OLD PRACTIONER.
PHILADELPHIA, Sept. 18, 1855.