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1867 Nov. 24 I wish to investigate the nature of a simple [wraph] Such a concept first arises as predicated of some object (occasion of experience) S is M On the ground of some previous representation of the object. (Not immediate) The predication of the concept is virtually contained in the previous representation
To say that a simple concept is the immediate apprehension of a quality is [that] a mode of saying that its meaning is given in the repre sentation which gives rise to it [inasmuch] as it [is] as much [is] to say that that quality is contained in the representation.
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Oct 2
Of the Effect of a Change of Information
Suppose it is learned that Any S is P Not P is not S Some P is S Then S receives an addition to its comprehension not S to its extension P an addition to its extension Any S is not P not P receives an addition to its extension not S receives an addition to its extension Also S receives an indefinite addition to its extension
If are looking at an S find it to be P. Some S is P This adds to the extension of P - supposing we know what S Any S is not P This adds to the comprehension of S - supposing we know something of not P
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When I conceive a things as say "three" or say 'necessary' I necessarity have some concrete object in my imagination.I have some concrete [which]- 'the necesary' By saying that I have the necesary in my mind, it is not meant that I have simply the chapter necessity. For what I am thinking is no- necessity but the necessary. Then I must have something which i recognize as a general sign of the necessary. But which should that particular feeling which is a sign of the necessary be a sign of that any more than of anything else? Because [?] my constitution very true.
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When I conceive as say "necessary", I have some singular object present to my imagination I have not all necessary things separately imaged. Doubted whether I ever have an absolutely singular object.