MS 427a (1902) - Minute Logic - Chapter II - Section I

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Classification of the Sciences

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thoroughgoing and scientific manner. For my part, Having devoted many years to the study it, I am entitled to my opinion upon a metaphysical question; although it may be a mistaken one; and in my opinion, it is a shallow and [seidistic?] metaphysics which declares a "real class", in the sense in which these writers attach to the term, to be an impossible thing. However, as far as I am concerned, I do not find At the same time, I am unable tos see any need at all in positive science of for considering such metaphysically real classes. It seems to me that To my apprehension the business of classification due has nothing to do no concern with them, but only with true and natural classes, in another and a purely experiential sense. For example, if I were to attempt to classify the arts, which I shall not do, I should have to recognize, as one of them, the art of illumination, and should have occasion to remark that lamps form a true, real, and natural class, because every lamp has been made and has come into being as a result of an aim common and peculiar to all lamps. A class, of

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course, is the total of whatever objects there may be in the universe which have are of a certain description. What if we try taking the term "natural" or "real class" to mean a class of which all the members owe their existence as members of the class to a common final cause? In the case of lamps, we know what that sense it: that instinct which enables us to distinguish human productions and to divine their purpose gives informs us of this with a degree of certainly which it were futile to hope that any science could surpass. But in the case of natural classes the final cause remains occult. Perhaps, since phrases retain their sway over men's minds long after their meaning has evaporated, maybe that some reader may, even at this day, remains imbued with the old notion that there are no final causes in nature; in which case, natural selection, and every form of evolution, will be false. For evolution is nothing more nor

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less than the working out of a definite end. A final cause may be conceived to operate without having been the purpose of any mind: that supposed phenomenon goes by the name of fate. The doctrine of evolution refrains from pronouncing whether forms result by are simply fated ot whether they are providential; but that definite ends are worked out none of us today any longer deny. Our eyes have been opened; and the evidence is too overwhelming. In regard to natural objects, however, it may be said, in general, that we do not know precisely what their final causes are. But that need not that prevent us from ascertaining whether or not there is a common cause which makes all the members of a given class somehow to have by virtue of which those things that have the essential characters of the class exist are enabled to exist? Namely, the The manner of distribution of the class-character will show, with a high degree of certainly, whether the class or not it is determinative of existence. Take, for example, the character of having class of animals that have legs.

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The use of legs is clear to us, having them ourselves. But if we pass the animal kingdom in review, we see that in the majority of branches there are no such organs of locomotion; while in the others they are present throughout some whole classes. and are absent throughout others; That is and in still others are sometimes present, sometimes absent. With such a distribution, begs this mode of locomotion may be so connected with the possibility of a form, that it would the animals of the same order could not differ in respect to using legs; but it is evident tht animals having legs do not form a natural group; for they are not separated from all others in any other important particular. We thus get a tolerably clear idea of what a natural class is: it will amply suffice for our present purpose; though we can hardly hope that it will turn out to be logically accurate. We also see that, when an object has been made with a purpose, as is, of course, the case with the sciences, no classes can be more fundamental nor broader than those which are

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Desire always General.

defined by the purpose. A purpose is an operative desier. Now a desire is always general; that is, it is always some kind of thing or event which is desired; at least, until the element of will, which is always exercised upon an individual object upon an individual occasion, becomes so predominant as to overrule the generalizing character of desire. Thus, desires create classes, and extremely broad classes. But desires become, in the pursuit of them, more specific. Take Let us revert, for example, to lamps. We desire, in the first instance, merely economical illumination. But we remark that that may be carried out by combustion, which creates where there is a chemical process kindling itself, or heat may be supplied from without in electric lighting, or it may be stored up, as in phosphorescence. These three ways of carrying out our main purpose constitute of our subsidiary purposes. * So if we, decide upon electric lighting, the question will be between incandescent and arc lighting. If we decide upon combustion, the

* I am here influenced by the Essay on Classification of L.Agassiz, whose pupil I was for a few months. It appeared at a most inauspicious epoch.

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