MS 464-465 (1903) - Lowell Lecture III - 3rd Draught

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questions. Yet since I am asked, I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what makes a reasoning sound is the fact real law that that the general method which that reasoning more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the truth. The very essence of an argument,— that which distinguishes it from all other kinds of signs,— is that it professes to be the representative of a general method of procedure tending toward the truth. To say that this method tends toward the true is to say that it is a real law that existences will follow. Now if that profession is true, and the conclusions of that method really

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will be true, to the extent and in the manner in which the argument pretends that they will, the argument is sound; if not, it is a false pretension and is unsound. I thus make the soundness of argument to consist in the facts of the case and not at all in whether the reasoner feels confidence in the argument or not. I may further say that there are three great classes of argument Deductions, Inductions, and Abductions; and these profess to tend toward the truth in very different senses, as we shall see. I suppose this answers the question intended. However, it

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is possible that my correspondent did not intend to ask in what I think the soundness of reasoning consists but by the question “What makes reasoning sound?” he may mean “What causes men to reason right?” That question I did substantially answer in my first lecture. Namely, to begin with, when a boy or girl first begins to criticize his inferences, and until he does that he does not reason, he finds that he has already strong prejudices in favor of certain ways of arguing. Those prejudices whether they be inherited or acquired, were first formed

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under the influence of the environing world, so that it is not surprising that they are largely right or nearly right. He, thus, has a basis to go upon. But if he has the habit of calling himself to account for his reasonings, as all of us do more or less, he will gradually come to reason much better; and this comes about through his criticism, in the light of experience, of all the factors that have entered into reasonings that were performed shortly before the criticism. Occasionally, he goes back to the criticism of habits of reasoning which have governed him for many years. That

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is my answer to the second question.

I desire now to say that, in order to be of as much help as I can to those who may be interested in the subject, it is my intention for the next three Sunday afternoons from 3 to 6 o'clock to be at my room at No 6 Prescott Hall, 474 Broadway, Cambridge, where I shall be extremely happy to see any of you who may wish for any explanation from me.

I was advertized to speak tonight of the three Universal Categories. I will try to say something about them; but my last lecture was not half finished owing to untoward circumstances, and tonight I must begin with