35

1908 Nov 9
Logic
19

comes to us through experience, and this experience takes the
form of sensations arising, as it appears to us, from excitations of
our different afferent nerves. I do not care whether this be a deceptive
appearance or not. It seems to me that, in any case, every such
sensation is merely the access of that kind of awareness that we call
a feeling. Now my object is that every feeling is in itself entirely
simple. I will present one argument at a time in support of this
assertion. If you succeed in refuting it, I will offer another;
and if you refute that I shall have still another; and we shall
see whether my arguments or your refutations become
exhausted first. You certainly cannot admit what everyone of these
arguments seems to prove without renouncing what you have
just said, to wit, that you were ever 'directly aware' of Etna, since