C. S. Peirce Manuscripts

Pages That Need Review

MS 425 (1902) - Minute Logic - Chapter I

26
Needs Review

26

Logic 26 on the light of nature.

reason called the "light of nature" to distinguish it from the "light of grace" which comes by revelatio, has been the opinion entertained by the majority of careful logicians.

The phrase "light of reason", or itd near equivalent, may probably be found in every literature. The 'old philosopher' of china, Lao-Tze, who lived in the VI century B.C, says for example, "Where useth reason's light, and turneth back, and goeth home to its enlightenment, surrendered not him persons perdition. This is called practising the eternal." The doctrine of a light of reason seems to be inwrapped in the old Babylonian philosophy of the first chapter of Genesis, where the Godhead says, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." It may, no

Lao-Tse's Tao-Teh-King. By Paul.Carns. Chicago: 1898. Chapter lii 33.

Last edit about 6 years ago by laika
153
Needs Review

153

introductive argument. I furthermore show that they invariably leave the doors open, theoretically and practically, a bad reasoning. In fact, there are no rules at all, for the most part, which follow as necessary corollaries from these theories. From the ordinary theories of hypothesis, on the other hand, rules do flow; buth they are particularly pestiferous rules, much worse than none at all; and these unfortunately have bocome, through judge's changes is juries and otherwise, widely current away people who ever opened a book of logic.

Having this examined the general docturne of the validity of reasonings, I next consider the trutch of propositions not based on reasonings, such as axions, facts of perception, moral judgements, and the like.

As a supplement to Critical Logic, I add a chapter upon fallacies, the ordinary ones, some mathematical fallacies, fallacies of introduction and

Last edit over 5 years ago by isobel
154
Needs Review

154

abduction, fallacies to erroneous logical doctrines (burden of proof, direct cause, ect.)

All this brings us close to Methodentic, or Speculative Rhetoric. The practical want of a good treatment of this subject is acute. It is not to be expected that any general [ductrine?] shall teach men much about methods of solving problems that re familiar to them. But in problems a little remote from those which they are accustomed, it is remarkable hoe, not merely common minds, but those of very highest order, stumble about helplessly. No class of thinkers can by anybody. be rated higher in [beuretic?] genius than the mathematicians; and yet see how they have boggled over comparitively simple [good?] [lerns?] of unfamiliar kinds, such as [Termatif?] Theorems, Stainer of theorems, the problem of mapoloring, the theory of knots.

Last edit over 5 years ago by isobel
155
Needs Review

155

Many persons will think that there are other ways of acquiring skill in the art of inquiry which will be more instructive that the logical study of the theory of inquiry. That may be; I shall not [disputeir?]; for it would carry me far beyond the confines of my province. I only claim that however much one may learn in other ways of the method of attacking an unfamiliar problem, something may be added to that knowledge by considering the general theory of how research must be performed. At the same time, it is this theory itself, for itself, which will have to be the principal object.

In coming to speculative rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic have been well-settled, there can be no serious [objection?] to relaxing the severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how we think, and the like. The regulation

Last edit over 5 years ago by isobel
156
Needs Review

156

has served its end; why should it be allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodentic practically useful? But while the justice of this must be admitted, it is also to be borne in mind that there is a purely logical doctrine of how discovery must take place, which, however great or little is its importance, it is my plain task and duty here to explore. In addition to this, there may be a pcychological account of the matter of the atmost importance and ever do extensive. With this, it is not my business here to meddle; at though I may here and there make such use of it as I can in aid of my own doctrine.

Time was when a Theorem could constitute a considerable contribution to mathematical science. But now new Theorems are turned out wholesale. A single [treatise?] will contain hundreds of them. Nowadays methods

Last edit over 5 years ago by isobel
157
Needs Review

157

alone can arrest attention strongly; and these are coming in such flocks, that the next step will surely be to find a method of discovering methods. This can only come from a theory of the method of discovery. In order to cover every possibility, this should be founded on a general doctrine of methods of attainship purposes, in general; and this, in turn, should spring from a still more general doctrine of the nature of teleological action, in general.

Although the number of works upon Methodetnic since Bacon's [Novum Organum?] has been large, none has been greatly illuminative. Bacon's work was a total failure, elaquently pointing out some obvious points of error, and to some minds stimulating, but affording no real help to an earnest inquirer. The [task?] on this subject remains to be written; and what I am chielfly

Last edit over 5 years ago by isobel
158
Needs Review

158

concerned to do is to make writing of it more possible.

I do not claim that the part of the present volume which deals with Speculative Rhetoric will approach that ideal. As to the other points of my book, this [gosfatory?] chapter commits one to producing a work of great importance or to being set down a drawler of nonsence. But for the methodentic part, I only say that since my youth I have associated with strong thinkers and have never close to make it a point to study their handling of other problems in all its details. When I was young, no remark was more frequent than that a givem method, though excellent in one science, would be disastrous in another. If a mere aging of the externals of a metjod were meant, the remark might pass. But it was, on the contrary, applied [treetensions?] of methods in their hue souls. I only continued myself thar, on the contrary, that was the way in whch methods maybe improved; and

Last edit over 5 years ago by isobel
159
Needs Review

159

great things have been accomplished during my life-time by such extensions. I mention my early foreseeing that it would be so, because it led me, in studying the methods which I saw pursued by scientific men, mathematicians, and other thinkers, although to seek to generalize any conception of their methods, as far as it could be done without destroying their forcefulness of those methods. this statement will serve to show about how much its to be expected from this part of my work.

With Speculative Rhetoric, logic in the sense of Normative Semeotic is brought to a close. But now we have to examine whether there be a doctrine of signs corresponding to [Hegel's?] objective logic; that is to say, whether there be a life in Signs, so that, - the requisite vehicle being present, - they will go through a certain order of develepment, and if so, whether this development

Last edit over 5 years ago by isobel
187
Needs Review

187

Logic 47

Are as emphatic on the other side. The former declares that psychology has no influence upon logic; the latter, "In der Logik ist es notwendig, alles Psychologische zu ignorieren zu ignorieren."

Last edit almost 4 years ago by Deborahannwarner
195
Needs Review

195

Logic 56

Come into its province to tell us what we shall be compelled to think about a question in geology.

Last edit almost 4 years ago by Deborahannwarner
Displaying pages 31 - 40 of 392 in total