C. S. Peirce Manuscripts

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MS 427b (1902) - Minute Logic - Chapter II - Section I

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Logic II 234

Species will study instincts of locomotion and migration. A fifth species will be the instincts for games.

Last edit almost 4 years ago by Deborahannwarner
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Logic II 258

Lesghian, and others which he does not name.

Last edit almost 4 years ago by Deborahannwarner
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Logic II 281

Family 3 is the history of achivement, with three genera, relative respectively to the histories of arts.

Last edit almost 4 years ago by Deborahannwarner

MS 432 (1902) - Minute Logic - Chapter IV

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not: as a matter of fact we are interested in learning what the conditions of true inference are: so we will just turn to where that question is considered. I fear that my present protest against their doing so may escape their eyes. But I will proceed to set down my reasons for holding that pure ethics, as just defined, although not part of logics is a matter of vital importance to the student of logic.

Here reasoning nothing more than what the old text books set forth, a man might be ever so great a rogue without being the worse reasoner for that. But in performing inductions certain moral virtues are required. A certain kind of probity is essential to succession of this work. In the highest presumptive reasoning, positive elevation of soul is called for. It is usually true, to say the least that a man must prefer the truth to his own vanity and even

Last edit over 6 years ago by guest_user
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withstanding all the progress it has made, it is still far from having so much as satisfactorily resolved its principal problem. But there is one circumstance which must render logic greatly dependent upon ethics. Logic seeks to ascertain the formal conditions of truth. But what is truth? "The conformity of a representation of its object," says Kant. We might state the matter a little more explicitly; but the definition will answer our present purpose, well enough. It is correct, or nearly so, as far as it is intelligible. But what is this "object," which serves to define truth? It is something real; that is, it is such that taking any individual sign or any individual collection of signs (such, for example, as all the ideas that ever enter into a given man's head). There is some character which that thing possesses whether that which that sign or any of these signs represents possesses it or not. Very well, so far: but what does it mean to say that an object possesses

Last edit over 6 years ago by guest_user
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a character? When we come to study Definition, we shall be able to answer this question with more certainty than we can at present do; yet it is even now sufficiently plain that we can only reach a conception of the unknown through the known, and that consequently the only meaning we can attach to the phrase that a thing "has character" is that something is true of that thing. So there we are back at our starting-point; and jesting Pilate would only have wasted time had he stayed for an answer. Indeed, when one comes to consider it, how futile it was to seek a definition of truth in the more remote reality!

Last edit over 6 years ago by guest_user

MS 433 (1902) - Minute Logic - Chapter IV

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LOGIC Chapter IV. ETHICS

It is pretty generally admitted that logic is a normative sicent, that is to say, it not only lays down rules which ought to be, but need not be followed; but it is the analysis of the condition of attainment of something of purpose is an essential ingredient. It is, therefore, closely related to an art; from which, however, it differs markedly in that its primary interest lies in understanding those conditions, and only secondarily in aiding the accomplishment of the purpose. Its business is analysis, or, as some writers prefer to say definition. The word normative was invented in the school of Schleirmacher. The majority of writers who make use of it tell us that there are three normative sciences, Logic, Esthetics, and Ethics, the doctrines of the True, tho Beautiful, and the Good, a trial of ideals which has been recognized since antiquity. on the other hand,

Last edit over 5 years ago by kheilajones
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Logic IV. 2 , we quite commonly find the term "normative science" restricted to Logic and Ethics, and Schlaiermacher himself states their purposes in a way that seems to give room for no third. The one, he says, relates to making thought conform to being, the other to making being conform to thought. There seems to be much justice in this restriction. For that which renders Logic and Ethics peculiary normative is that nothing can be either logically true or morally good without a purpose to be so. For a propostion, and especially the conclusion of an argument, which is only accidentally true is not logical. On the other hand, a thing is beautiful or ugly quite irrespective of any purpose to be so. It would seem, therefore, that esthetics is no more essentially normative than any nomological science. The science of optics, for example, might be regarded as the study of the conditions to be observed in making use of light. Under such a conception,

Last edit over 5 years ago by kheilajones
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Logic IV 3 nothis essential to optics would be omitted, nor anything foreign to it inserted. Those writes, however, who stand out for the trinity of normative sciences do so upon the ground that they correspond to three fundamental categories of objects of desire. As to that, the logician may be exempted form inquiring whether the Beautiful is a distinct ideal or not; but he is bound to say how it may be with the True; and accordingly the intentionof this chapter is to lay the foundation for the doctrine, which will appear more and more evident as we proceed, that that Truth the conditions of which the logician endeavors to analyze, and which a phase of the [summun?] [bonun?] which forms the subject of pure ethics, and that neither of those men can really understand himself until he preceives clearly that it is so.

Last edit over 5 years ago by kheilajones
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Logic IV 4

I hope I shall not be thought to wander if I note one observation by the way, before formally settling down to the questions. Were there nothing in reasoning ore than the old traditional treatises [so?] forth, then a roguemights be as good a reasoner as a man of honor; althoug a coward could not, even wander such an idea of reasoning. But in indution a habit of provity is needed for success: a trickster is sure to play the confidence game upon himself. And in addition to probity, industry is essential. In the presumptive choice of hypotheses, still higher virtues are needed,- a true elevation of soul. At the very lowest, a man might prefer the truth to his own interest and well-being and not merely to his bread and butter, and to his own vanity, too, if he is to do much in science. This will appear in the logical discussion; and it is thoroughly [borne?] out by examining the characters of scientific men and of great [heretic?]

Last edit over 5 years ago by kheilajones
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