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21

government like ours, than the danger of losing the office in
Great Britain does by offending the king. And it is sur-
prising that the obvious good effects of this independence in
judges, in securing unbiassed decisions, have not induced
our legislators to extend the same independence to inferior
courts, and to many executive officers.

It is a mistake, and a most mischievous one, to sup-
pose that annual or frequent elections are the proper cor-
rectives of mal-administration in judges and executive
officers. The proper correctives are impeachment or other
punishment ; not the popular odium against an officer which
may be excited withut just cause, and even by the most
meritorious acts of the officer in the faithful discharge of his
duty.

The proper rule in our governments appears to be this.
The citizens composing the state, being the sources of
power, should be the constituents of the legislature, the supreme acting power of the state ; but the legislature or a
council designated for the purpose, should be the appointing
power ; and also the impeaching or punishing power. This
is the fact now in regard to many officers, in our state
governments. The appointing power should not be in-
vested in a single magistrate elected by the people, unless
some provision can be made to restrain him effectually from
using the power to secure his election. And how is this to
be done ?

The office of president is a prize of too much magni-
tude not to excite perpetual dissensions ; and if the conten-
tions for the office of chief magistrate, do not ultimately
overthrow our constitution, it will be a miracle. It is de-

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