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NAVAL TACTICS.
Mahan, A. T. Fleet battle tactics.
FLEET BATTLE TACTICS, MAHAN
Written in April + May 1886 and never revised
Lectures at the War College,
Written in April-May 1886, and never since revised. A. T. M.
Fleet Battle Tactics.
It is trite to say that in approaching the study of Naval Warfare under present conditions, we have before us a problem that is not one wholly new, but also one as to which we have to guide us little or no practical information, on which to base any certain conclusions.
We have three recognized weapons, the familiar Gun, Ram and Torpedo; familiar in name, but save one, most unfamiliar in use, in place of the one with which our forefathers had to trouble themselves; for as to boarding, when it came to that, the hour for science was over and that of simple brute force was begun.
Of our three weapons we have experience in the use of one, the Gun; experience I mean, to a greater or less extent, under the actual condition of use at sea; although there is doubtless a tendency on the part of many of us to choose, for our little expenditures of ammunition, conditions of wind and weather which will favor a good target report. Still we must all have had forcibly impressed upon us the fact that our guns are on a very restless platform, and must have imbibed a certain indifference to the wonderful accuracy of modern guns at very long ranges. Their great advantage to us lies in the flatness of their trajectory at moderate ranges, in the increase of the point blank and low elevation ranges. There is lack ing to our service experimental knowledge of the comparitive accuracy of guns fired nearly in the fore andaft line in a sea way;
2 the Intelligence Office has no data as to the comparative accuracy, under the same conditions, of guns fired in broadside and those fired at targets ahead or astern; nor am I aware of any adequate reports from more advanced navies. It seems probable, however, that the greatest source of bad firing, that which springs from frequent and rapid changes of elevation of the piece through the rolling of the ship, would be much lessened in those pieces. Even in the position most unfavorable for broadside guns with the sea abeam or a little forward of it, the guns lying fore and aft would be comparatively steady, the axis of the bore would swing through out a small vertical arc.
As regards the ram it is hard to see how practical tests of a very satisfactory character are to be made. We have been told that ramming drills have been instituted in Russia between launches or very small vessels, and such drills must be very much better than nothing at all. It (must be something, nay it) is a good deal to have learned the difficulty of hitting another boat on the wing, and a very salutary lesson to have found your enemy in such a position that you cannot dodge him. But from these mimic combats it is a long step to the pilot house of a ram meant for the line of battle, and handling her at a high speed among other ships. Nevertheless good working maxims for ramming contests may be deduced from these mimic contests.
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The torpedo admits of more thorough practical test, without risk of doing damage. Its range, time of flight, accuracy under varying conditions can all be settled, everything but the personal equation. When discharged from a large ship, or a ship in contest with an equal, there should be no greater demand for nerve than when firing a gun from the same; in an attack by small torpedo boats, or by vessels very vulnerable as compared with the ship assailed, the strain on the nerves will be greater. In all sham battles of torpedo boats against ironclads, I should, in estimating the results, be inclined to allow largely for the fact that the men in the boats knew they would not be sunk; not that there are not plenty of men bold enough to carry through such enterprises, the history of torpedo warfare, young as it is, shows this fully; but I think it may be safe ly said, and the whole history of warfare proves it, that all desperate enterprises which require not only courage, but skill used with coolness are peculiarly open to failure; the men who, holding their lives in their hands, with the chances against them, can seize the right moment, neither too soon nor too late, are exceptional. In a navy relying to any extent on torpedo boats, large practise should be lead ^had?^ to find out the good shots; then it would be necessary to count upon a large percentage of failure among these good shots, from various causes, in time of battle.
I think from such considerations as I have mentioned, and there