Cornelius Ryan WWII papers, box 007, folder 52: John J. Dolan

[crossed out][illegible][end crossed out] 82nd AB DOLAN, John J. 505th MASS

Box 7, #52

82nd 505th

Fight for Merderet Bridge

ARTHUR J. MARTIN JOSEPH W. BREEN JOHN F. DAVIS

TELEPHONE HANCOCK 6- 6550 6552

JOHN J. DOLAN ATTORNEY AT LAW BOX 1272, 141 MILK STREET BOSTON 4. MASS.

March 23, 1959

Lt. General James M. Gavin c/o Arthur D. Little, Inc. 30 Memorial Drive Cambridge, Mass.

Dear General Gavin:

Thank you for your letter of March 10, 1959. It had always been my intention of answering the questionnaire of Cornelius Ryan; but realizing that it would take considerable time to give a detailed and accurate account, I kept putting it aside and then completely forgot about it until Bob Murphy spoke to me about it a few days before receipt of your letter.

I shall try to cover as much detail without making this letter too voluminous, leaving it to your judgment and discretion to delete any portion that you deem unfavorable to the outfit.

You may recall that I was in command of Company "A", 505 Prcht.Infantry, with the rank of First Lieutenant. The specific mission of the Company "A" was to seize and defend the bridge crossing the Merderet River on the road that ran East to West from Ste. Mere Eglise, with the purpose of preventing the movement of German troops down to the beach-head.

I don't recall exactly what time the first Batallion jumped, but it was between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. on "D" Day. We hit out drop zone right on the nose, because within twenty minutes to one-half hour, I knew our exact location. I was able to identify a "T" intersection, dirt roads 8 to 10 feet wide, near our drop zone. The upper arm of which ran generally east to west, the vertical arm running north to south, to meet the road running from Ste. Mere Eglise to our objective, the bridge at the Merderet River.

We had the usual problems of re-organization in the dark; however, about an hour before dawn, Company "A" moved out from the drop zone with about ninety (90) per cent of the men accounted for. (This was not due to luck alone, but to the cooperation of my Officers, Non-Coms, and last but not least, training. Men who have to fight in the night should

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be trained in night-time fighting, not just taken on a night march and digging fox holes.) We moved along this dirt road which I previously referred to as being the North-South arm of the "T" intersection, and just around here, I ran into Major McGinity. He moved out with us.

The order of March was first, Co. Headquarters, third and second platoons in that order. When we reached the road running EastWest from Ste. Mere Eglise, a German motorcyle passed us going toward Ste. Mere Eglise. At this time, it was still dark, but daylight was starting to break. We crossed the road and started west toward the bridge, with a hedge row to our right between us and the road. Just about this time, contact was lost with the first platoon, so the third platoon took the lead.

About seven to eight hundred yards from the bridge, we came upon a dirt road running southeasterly from the road to the bridge. Hedge rows were on either side of this road; and beyond it in the direction of the bridge, was an open, flat field, about 100 yards deep, and about 75 yards wide. It was here that I figured the Germans would defend if they intended a defense of the bridge.

I directed Lt. Donald Coxon to send his scouts out. This he did, and he also went out with them. He had plenty of personal courage but he didn't have the heart to order them out without going with them.

A few moments later, a German machine gun opened up, killing Lt. Coxon and one of his scouts, Fergueson. Their fire was returned; and, with Major McGinity and myself leading, a few men holding and returning frontal fire, the platoon flanked to the left. At the same time, I directed Lt. Presnell to re-cross the road and attack along the northerly side down to the bridge. This was done, and the second platoon didn't meet with any fire until they arrived at the bridge.

The third platoon continued its flanking move and cut back in toward the road to the bridge. Because of the fire, we calculated that there was just one machine gun crew that was in our way. It later turned out that there must have been at least a squad dug in at this point, with at least two of them armed with machine pistols. Prisoners captured later, in addition to the German dead, amounted to about the size of one of our platoons. There were no German officers captured. I don't know whether or not any of their enlisted escaped.

To continue, we cut toward the road, travelling in a Northerly direction. Major McGinity was leading and I was about three or four paces behind, and slightly to the right. There was a high, thick hedge row to our left, and it was in here that I figured the machine gun was located.

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When we had travelled about two-thirds of the way up the hedge row, they opened up on us with rifle fire, and at least two machine pistols. I returned the fire with my Thompson Sub-Machine Gun at a point where I could see leaves in the hedge row fluttering. Major McGinity was killed instantly. As luck would have it, there was a German foxhole to my left, which I jumped into and from where I continued to fire. I could only guess where to shoot, but I had to, as part of the Third platoon was exposed to their fire. Lt. McLaughlin, the assistant platoon leader was wounded and died later that day. His radio operator was also killed. The platoon by now was under fire from two directions, from the point where I was pinned down, and also from the direction of the bridge.

I can't estimate how long we were pinned down in this fashion, but it was at least an hour. I made several attempts to move, but drew their fire. On my last attempt, I drew no fire. They obviously had pulled out.

During all of this time, I could hear rifle and machine gun fire down by the bridge on the north side. This ceased about this time. I returned to the rest of the third platoon, instructed the Non-Coms to re-organize and to maintain their present position. I then crossed the road and located the first platoon commanded by Lt. Oakley on the north side. They were moving toward the bridge, so I instructed them to continue and dig in on the right side. I went down to the bridge and found that we had received an assist from some of the 508 Prcht. Infantry. About this time, I ran into Col. Eckman, and sent for my third platoon to dig in on the left or south side of the bridge. The first was already digging in one the north side.

I thought that all of the Germans had retreated; but unknown to us, there were about ten or twelve Germans holed up on the second floor of a stucco-type farm house. At the time they started firing, Col. Eckman and I were casually looking the situation over. It lasted about twenty minutes with about ten or twelve Germans surrendering. About a squad of men from the 508 made the actual capture.

We dug in, the disposition of my Company as follows: First platoon on the north side of the road, the third on the south and the second in reserve, about 400 yards back, so that it could also protect the rear.

Major Kellam arrived at the bridge with Capt. Roysden, his S-3. He had most of his C.P. unit with him. I don't know whether or not a Batallion C.P. had ever been set up as planned, at least, I don't recall having had any communication with it. Down at the bridge now was most of Company "A", about one platoon of Company "B", a platoon

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of the Division Engineers (mission to blow the bridge if necessary), about half of Batallion Headquarters Company with mortars and machine gun sections and several stray men from other regiments.

The Company dug in well and quickly. I had just completed my inspection of the forward positions when we knew that an attack was coming. You will recall that in front of our position, west of the Merderet River, was a marsh at least 1000 yards wide at its narrowest point. The road running west from the bridge could better be described as a causway.

As I recall, the mission of the 508 was to occupy a position beyond this causway. In addition to the men who assisted us in capturing the bridge at least a company of the 508 passed through our position and moved over the causway to their objective. They were gone at least an hour when we saw several of them retreating back across the marsh. I remember that we helped several of them out of the river, which was quite shallow.

The machine gun fire from the Germans was very heavy by now. We didn't return their fire as there were no visible targets and our ammunition supply was limited. They attacked with three tanks, which I was unable to identify for sure; but they appeared to be similar to the German Mark IV type, or maybe a little lighter. The tanks were firing on us with machine guns and cannon.

Just about a half-hour before this attack, a 57MM A. T. gun was assigned to Company "A". I located this gun about 150 yards from the bridge on the road where it curves to the right as you approach the bridge. Incidentally, this was my C.P. and later the Batallion C.P. This gave the gun excellent cover and a good field of fire.

On the bridge I had three bazooka teams. Two of them were from Company "A" and the third was either from "B", or "C" Company. The two Company "A" bazookas were dug in to the left and right of the bridge. Because of the fact that the road itself was the causeway type, they were as of necessity dug in below the level of the road, so that in order to fire, they had to get out of their fox holes. The third bazooka was over more to the south where better cover was available.

To continue, I had just completed my inspection of our defenses and was 40 to 50 yards from the bridge. Major Kellam and Captain Roysden were nearby.

The first two tanks were within 15 or 20 yards of each other, the third was back about 50 yards. When the lead tank was about 40 or 50 yards away from the bridge, the two Company "A" bazooka teams