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of the units which had dropped in the general area. There were a
number of carts and quite a few mules in the farm buildings held
by the force. Putting the mules to the carts, four patrols formed
up, including a driver and about five or six riflemen in each, to
return to the drop zones and collect all the weapons and ammunition
that could be found. They were under fire all the way but they came
back with the carts fairly well loaded. This work occupied them up
till noon. Meanwhile there were more men coming in. The German fire
on the Bse Addeville position continued, and the force kept getting
casualties from bullet and mortar fire. Jump casualties---men with
sprains and breaks---also began to find the rendezvous. A first-aid
station was sent up and kept busy. All morning runner contact was
maintained with the men at the lock; the runners reported that the
force me doing OK and there was no increase in enemy pressure.
However, casualties were mounting at the lock from the enemy fire.
That was all Johnson knew about his general situation. He had heard
no word from Division. He knew nothing of what was happening to
other American forces. Around noontime , one of the medical men got
a small radio into operation, just in time to get the noon broadcast
from London. The broadcast said that the invasion was going accord-
ing to plan and the operation of the American airborne divisions were
meeting with success. Johnson turned to Allen: "I've decided. If
things are going well elsewhere, the thing to do is make ourselves
as strong as possible at the locks, then get to the bridges as
quickly as we can and blow them." He said he would take the most
of the force and move back to le Barquette, and from there, he would
try to move on the bridges. He would leave Allen sufficient men to
cover his own withdrawal after darkness came. He said his CP would
be at the Pt de Lesseau road Junction. Lieut Fred A. Owens, per-
sonnel adjt , was sent with four men to move ahead of the main body,
look over the situation at the locks and see if the way was clear.
About that time, Lieut George W. Sefton, S-2 of Bn 2, reported in
with the information that Lt Col Robert A. Ballard had about 250
men and officers in the vicinity of les Doueries, NW of Addeville,
and was being heavily engaged by enemy fire. Johnson got Ballard
on radio---his first distance contact with any of his forces---and
asked him: "Can you join me at once?" Ballard replied: "I can’t.
We’re pinned by fire and the enemy force is between you and me."
Johnson then told him that he (Johnson) was taking his force on
down to the river to complete his mission, that he would leave
further instructions with Sefton, and that Ballard would disen-
gage and join him at the earliest possible moment. A large part
of the demolitions platoon was present, along with a quantity of
explosives collected in the drop zones; they would be needed in
the attack upon the bridges near Carentan. They went along when
Johnson ’s force moved out from Addeville at about 1330, leaving
Allen with about 50 men at that position. Once again, they moved
along via the marshes and the canals, often wading through waist-
high water, or higher. They kept this up until they had moved out
of range of the enemy small arms fire. Finally, they got back into
the well-covered (screened by trees) dirt road which led down into
le Barquette. The march went along without opposition until just
as the force came about to the road intersection west of Peneme.
Then "all hell broke loose." The Germans had apparently watched