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φαν10

nor does it lead us into the divarications of those
who know no other logic than a “Natural History”
of thought. As to this, remark, I pray you, that “Natural History” is the term applied to the
descriptive sciences of nature, that is to say, to sciences which
describe different kinds of objects and
classify them as well as they can while they still remain ignorant
of their essences and of the ultimate agencies of their production
and which seek to explain the properties of those kinds by means of
laws which another branch of science called “Natural
Philosophy” has established. Thus a logic which is a
natural history merely, has done no more than observe that certain conditions
have been found attached to sound thought, but has no means
of ascertaining whether the attachment be accidental or
essential; and quite ignoring the circumstance that the very essence of thought lies open to our study;
which study alone it is that men have always called “logic,” or “dialectic.”

φαν10

nor does it lead us into the divarications of those
who know no other logic than a “Natural History”
of thought. As to this, remark, I pray you, that “Natural History” is the term applied to the
descriptive sciences of nature, that is to say, to sciences which
describe different kinds of objects and
classify them as well as they can while they still remain ignorant
of their essences and of the ultimate agencies of their production
and which seek to explain the properties of those kinds by means of
laws which another branch of science called “Natural
Philosophy” has established. Thus a logic which is a
natural history merely, has done no more than observe that certain conditions
have been found attached to sound thought, but has no means
of ascertaining whether the attachment be accidental or
essential; and quite ignoring the circumstance that the very essence of thought lies open to our study;
which study alone it is that men have always called “logic,” or “dialectic.”