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undaunted courage of true heroism. Washington
had judged him to be the man to be
thus trusted. But now, at every step,
an adverse fate threw new obstacles in
his way. Instead of glory he saw failure
before him, when he had taken the wisest
measures to insure success. Well might be
write, as early as the 7th of July, to his beloved
wife—that confidante of his most secret
thoughts, with whom he sought communion
amid his worst cares and perplexities—"I
have had to make most fatiguing marches,
endure much heat and overcome great difficulties;
but I am still far from the end. It is
even possible that after having reached the
goal assigned myself I shall be compelled to retreat
without striking a blow for want of provisions.
I would fain be rid of my command,
than which there can be nothing more annoying
or difficult. My present position makes
me doubly anxious to return to you as soon
as possible." It is not to be wondered, therefore,
that when Gen. Gates—appointed by
Congress without consulting Washington—
arrived to supersede him, De Kalb, instead of
complaining of the injustice done him, felt a
sincere feeling of relief. With his usual
straightforward frankness he told Gates as
much in a letter when he heard of the latter's
arrival at Hillsborough. Briefly, but clearly,
he gave him at the same time such information
concerning the condition and resources
of his little army that a less conceited
officer than the conqueror of Saratoga
would have avoided the terrible
disasters which followed his assuming the
command. "I am made happy by your
arrival," wrote De Kalb, "for I have struggled
with a good many difficulties for provisions
ever since I arrived in this State, and
although I have put the troops on short
allowance for bread, we cannot get even that;
no flour laid in, and no disposition made for
any but what I have done by military authority;
no assistance from the legislative or
executive power, and the greatest unwillingness
in the people to part with anything."
He states that his design "to move nearer
the enemy to drive them from Pee Dee river,
a plentiful country, has been defeated by the
impossibility of subsisting on the road, and
no immediate supplies to be depended on in
the first instance after a difficult march."
He will prepare exact returns of the regular
troops of the department, "but," he remarks,
"I could hardly depend on any but
the Maryland and Delaware regiments of
my division, with a small number of artillerymen
and Col. Armand's legion, and all
those very much reduced by sickness, discharges
and desertion." Owing to the smallness
of his army he had kept only eight
pieces of artillery.
Gates reached camp on the 25th of July.
What was the general astonishment when,
on the very next day, he issued an order for
the army to march on the direct road for
Camden on the 27th!
Colonel Otho Holland Williams, than whom
a braver and nobler son of Maryland never
defended her flag, was De Kalb's adjutant-
general. Personally acquainted with Gates,
he was likely to have some influence in convincing
him of the folly of this course.
After consulting with De Kalb he went to
Gates and remonstrated with him. He
"represented that the country through
which he was about to march was by
nature barren, abounding with sandy plains,
intersected by swamps, and very thinly inhabited;
that the little provisions and forage
which were produced on the banks of its
few small streams were exhausted or taken
away by the enemy, and by the hordes of
tories who had retired from what they
called the persecution of the rebels, and who would
certainly distress his army, small as it was,
by removing out of his reach what little
might remain."
On the other hand, Col. Williams represented
that there was another route about
northwest, which had been contemplated by
Gen. De Kalb and the most active an intelligent
officers of the command. This was a
route that would cross the Pee Dee river
somewhere about where it loses the name of
Yadkin and lead them to the little town of
Salisbury, in the midst of a fertile country,
inhabited by a people zealous in the cause of
America. Not only did this route promise a
more plentiful supply of provisions, but the
wounded, in case of disaster, and the women
and children might have a safe asylum provided
for them at Salisbury or Charlotte, as
the militia of Mecklenburg and Rowan counties
were staunch friends. Col. Williams further
submitted that "the advantage of taking
the enemy's outposts in the flank was not to
be despised, even when obtained at the expense
of such a circuit, and that the army
itself might then advance upon the most important
of these outposts at Camden, with
the Wateree on its right flank and its friends
in the rear."
These and many other weighty considerations
had been drawn up in writing, and were
signed by the leading officers. Gates refused
to discuss their importance, and on being
pressed promised to consult his officers during
the bait at noon on the first day's march.
He failed, however, to keep this promise.
The officers were not called in consultation.
The distress of the troops on this march could
only be borne by the highest fortitude. The
hungry soldiers ate green ears of corn, boiled
without salt with the lean beef that could be
collected in the woods; they devoured green
peaches in lieu of bread, and this unwholesome
food increased daily the sick list. The
officers, more prudent, contented themselves
with eating the beef only, boiled or roasted.
"It occurred to some that the hair-powder
which remained in their bags would thicken
the soup, and it was actually applied."
THE BATTLE OF CAMDEN.
On the 7th of August, 1780, the much-desired
junction took place with the North
Carolina militia at the cross roads, about 15
miles east of the enemy's position, on Lynch
creek. On the 13th they encamped at Clermont,
twelve miles from Camden, and on the
following day were reinforced by a brigade
of seven hundred militia under Gen. Stevens.
On the 14th Gen. Sumpter, desiring to capture
the enemy's wagon train from Charleston,
sent an express to Gen. Gates soliciting
a reinforcement of regulars. Notwithstanding
the danger of reducing his already small
forces, Gates sent Col. Woolford, of the
Maryland line, with four hundred men, one
hundred of them being regulars, with two
pieces of artillery. He then made preparations
to advance, o the 15th, to a position
seven miles nearer to Camden.
On the approach of gates, Lord Rowdon had
concentrated his forces at Camden, in a position
flanked by the Wateree river and Pine-Tree
creek, and strengthened with redoubts.
Here Lord Cornwallis joined him on the 14th.
Cornwallis found his army much enfeebled
by sickness; he was misled into overrating
the American force, and he judged his position
to be, therefore, very critical; but delay
would only make that position worse, and he
would have the whole country up in arms
against him. He determined at once to take
the offensive and strike the first blow. For
this purpose he marched out of Camden with
a force of not quite 3,000 men, on that very
evening of August 15 chosen by Gates for
his forward movement. Both armies, ignorant
of each other's intentions, moved about
the same hour of the night. They met half-way
at 2 o'clock in the morning about half a mile
north of Saunder's creek. The first intimation
of their proximity was a heavy skirmish which
took place between their advanced guards.
The calvary of Armand's Legion, which was
in the American advance, suffered some loss
in this first shock, and, recoiling suddenly
on the First Maryland Brigade, occasioned a
general disorder, in which Lieut.-Col. Porterfield,
of the Virginia regulars, was mortally
wounded. Order was soon restored, however,
and the two armies halted and formed
their lines for action, but awaited the dawn
to resume hostilities. At this critical hour
Gates summoned his officers to a counsel of
war. When Adjutant-Gen. Williams brought
the invitation to De Kalb, and informed him
of what had taken place, the first remark
of the veteran was, "Well, did not
the commanding general immediately order
a retreat?" He had been strenuously
opposed to the advance movement, being
in favor of fortifying still further the natu-
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