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general resemblance in the conceptions of virtue in different coun-
tries and the general approval of it are due to the fact, not that
virtue is innate, but that virtue is profitable.

Let us then see if by using these two ideas as a founda-
tion we can not build up a theory of compensation which will make
divine support of morality superfluous. Richard Cumberland denies
that man is wholly selfish and adds to the egoistic motives of
Hobbes social and benevolent motives which are equally original.
According to him there is then a necessary connection between in-
dividual and social welfare which makes it impossible to secure
happiness except by subordinating oneself to the good of mankind.
He believes that this connextion would supply the ultimate ground
for the obligation to perform those benevolent acts in which mor-
ality rests.

This assumption, while it helps to build up a working
theory of compensation, is not necessary to the existence of such
a principle. Thomas Huxley has pointed out that man has evolved
from the lowest form of life millions of years ago to his present
state without being able to understand the idea of retribution.
If such immense progress has already taken place without the idea
of retribution in another life it would seem unnecessary to
devise such a theory to encourage men to be moral; especially now
that his mind and brain are suffiiently developed to tell him
that morality pays.

Man will always tend, and has always tended, to doing what
is right solely because his mind or his experience showed him it
would be profitable materially or mentally for him to do so. The
true criterion for morality is not god buth rather the greatest good
for the greatest number, and morality, judged by this standard,
will be followed by intelligent men because it is really good for the
individual and his children to live in as advanced a community as
possible, a purely selfish reason.

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