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refusal" of the only chance to save the garrisons had been made
on account of its effect on a division in the House, and if the
Khartoum garrison was to be massacred like the others, it must be massacred rather than faith be kept with Gordon.

Earl Granville filled up some of the time by impertinent mes-
sages to Gordon. On the 24th July (Blue-Book, No. 32, p. 29) he
directed Mr. Egerton to repeat his messages to Gordon of 23rd
April and 17th May (asking why he remained at Khartoum, &c.),
to tell him that those communications proved the interest taken
by Her Majesty's Government in him, and that they desired to
hear from him, "so that if danger has arisen or is likely to arise
in the manner they have described, they may be in a position to
take measures accordingly."

Those who ascribe the greatest blame to Gladstone must admit
that this despatch raises Granville's claims to a high pitch.

About this time M. Herbin, French Consul at Khartoum, wrote:
"Aucune crainte si ce n'est le manque de vivres (dans deux mois
nos vivres seront epuisés) ... mais nous sommes sans nouvelles
sûres, et nos moments sont comptés." The gallant Frenchman,
like Colonel Stewart and Power, could hardly be pursuaded to
leave Gordon and essay the descent of the Nile.

When Wolseley furnished in April details of measures for re-
lieving Khartoum, he included an alternative scheme to the
long route by the Nile. The route from Suakim to Berber was 245
miles and from Berber to Khartoum the distance was 210 miles. The
Nile Valley routes varied from 1,320 miles to 1,750 miles, according
to the extent to which land marches were availed of. General
Stephenson, who commanded in Egypt, advocated the route by
Suakim, and we learn from offical documents that, on 14th June,
the Government "determined to prepare" for constructing a rail-
way from Suakim to Berber. The character of their determination
is shown by the fact that, on the 7th August, they obtained a vote
of credit for £300,000, to enable them to take measures "for the
relief of General Gordon should they become necessary." (Blue-
Book, No. 35, p. 14.)

Mr. Gladstone's "some months" of hesitation, were not com-
pleted, however, until the 26th August, when a telegram from the
War Office (ib., p. 60), dated midnight, stated that, "after anxious
consideration," they had made up their minds, and that, after two
months of the Nile inundation had been lost, the some months of
the Government backwardness were at an end. Too late was in
the minds of all, but not in the actions of Wolseley and his com-rades.

Their campaign, so creditable to them, and so damning to the
Ministry, proved clearly enough that if Wolseley had been com-