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that his mind must always have been muddy, if it was never
clearer when he broke his word.

Never was the fable of the living donkey and the dead lion
illustrated more completely than by the living lord.

If Gordon was "mistaken in any calculation," it was in sup-
posing that an English Ministry would not wantonly be forsworn;
and his prompt demand for Zebehr on his arrival at Khartoum,
proves that the Kimberley complaint of Gordon's self-conceit as to
his own "name and influence" was as false as unworthy.

What Gladstone was not unblushing enough to do in the
Commons House, Lord Granville did without shame in the Lords.
With his despatch of 22nd February 1884, assigning the fear of
public opinion as the reason for the "great Refusal," on the table
to refute him, he had the insolence to aver (19th February 1885),
"we considered that Zebehr's appointment would have constituted
a danger to Gordon. ... My Lords, we agreed to any other form
of assistance which he might prefer."

His speech, of course, included praise of Gordon, but his words
were to the friends of Gordon offensive, as would be the intrusive
presence at a funeral of those by whose machinations the funeral
had been caused.

"The noble Earl spoke with justice (said Lord Salisbury) of the
sympathy and deep regret with which we all of us have heard of
the fall–I might say the sacrifice–of our Christian hero. But
these are not the only feelings which have been excited in the
breasts of the people of his country. There has not only been
sympathy and regret, but bitter and burning indignation. General
Gordon has been sacrificed to the squabbles of a Cabinet, and the
necessities of Parliamentary tactics."

When, at a later date (18th May 1885), Lord Napier of Magdala
expressed unwillingness to "re-open the wound caused by the
delays and refusals to relieve General Gordon," and added that
"the military character of the country had sustained a great blow
–he would almost say an irretrievable blow," Lord Granville was
not ashamed to reply that he did "not understand what the
gallant Field Marshal can have meant."

Perhaps his answer was true, and he was not able to comprehend
anything noble. His intelligence, however, appears to have stag-
gered strangely. How otherwise can be explained his maundering
contention that the Ministry would "have been accomplices in the
murder of General Gordon if they had acceded to his demand for
Zebehr," and that it would have been "a positive act of treachery"
to Gordon, to keep their promises to him?

This modern Boyet, however, who had gambled with the life of
Gordon, could "chide the dice in honourable terms," for he
added, "when we have destroyed the Mahdi, and are masters of