10

10

from his master into a free state would become free and could not
be reclaimed. Considering the facility of escape from many of the
slave states to the so called free states, this provision was a most ef-
ficient protection to us in the enjoyment of our property. But your
committee will not further press this view of the subject, as it is al-
ready familiar to the public mind.

It has been shewn that at the adoption of the constitution slavery
existed in every state which was a party to it except one. It was
recognized and guaranteed by that constitution itself, which was
the act of all the states. Is it competent for one party, by abolish-
ing slavery thereafter within her own jurisdiction, so to affect it in
other states as to destroy it as a subject of theft, and thereby, with-
out the consent of the other parties, change her duties under the con-
stitution. Surely one party cannot directly or indirectly vary or im-
pair the compact without the consent of the other. Had this ques-
tion arisen shortly after the adoption of the constitution, even upon
the principles of the governor of New York, there could have been
no difficulty as to his duties. Then slaves were property in New
York; and the governor says that if one man could be the property
of another, and thus become the subject of theft, the argument is at
an end. Was it competent for New York by any act of her own,
without the consent of the other parties, to modify or change her du-
ties under the compact, and to relieve herself from the discharge of
those duties under which she was acknowledgedly placed by its pro-
visions at the time of its adoption? Can such a proposition be in-
sisted on?

In the connexion it is proper to enquire what laws existed in Vir-
ginia, in relation to the stealing of slaves, at the adoption of the fede-
ral constitution. The same laws which are now in force in Virgi-
nia were in force then. Our statute contains two provisions upon this
subject. The first is in these words: "If any person or persons
shall hereafter be guilty of stealing any negro or mulatto slave what-
ever, and be thereof lawfully convicted, whether the said slave or
slaves so stolen shall have been taken out of or from the actual or im-
mediate possession of the owner or owners of such slave or slaves, or
shall have been elsewhere found, he or they shall be adjudged guilty
of felony, and shall undergo a confinement in the penitentiary for a
period not less than three nor more than eight years." (1. R. C.
page 427.) The other provision of our statute is in these words :
"Whosoever shall hereafter carry or cause to be carried, any slave or
slaves out of this commonwealth, or shall carry or cause to be car-
ried, any slave or slaves out of any county or corporation within this
commonwealth, into any other county or corporation within the same,
without the consent of the owner or owners of such slave or slaves,
or of the guardian of such owner or owners, if he, she or they be a
minor or minors, and with the intention to defraud or deprive such
owner or owners of such slave or slaves, shall be adjudged guilty of
felony, and subject to prosecution as in other cases of felony, and up-
on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not less than one hun-
dred nor more than five hundred dollars, and shall also be imprison-

11

ed in the jail or penitentiary house for a period not less than two nor
more than four years; which fine and imprisonment shall be fixed
and ascertained by a jury." In the next section of the act, it is fur-
ther enacted, "That not only all those who shall willingly and de-
signedly carry away slaves as aforesaid, but all masters of vessels
who have a slave or slaves on board their vessel, shall sail beyond
the limits of any county with such slave or slaves on board, shall be
considered as carrying off or removing such slave or slaves, within
the true intent and meaning of this act." (1. R. C. 428.) This sta-
tute was passed as early as 1753; and the only change which has
been made in it consists in the substitution in 1799, of confinement
in the penitentiary, in place of "death without benefit of clergy" as
the punishment for the felony created by it. Let it not be said that
these laws are harsh. They are less sanguinary than they were at
the adoption of the constitution. But if they be so, citizens of other
states need not come unless they choose, into Virginia; and if they
do they need not violate her laws and incur their penalties.

Thus stood the matter at the adoption of the federal constitution.
Did Virginia and the other southern states understand that the north-
ern states, by abolishing slavery within their limits, would take the
felony of stealing a slave out of the operation of the 2nd section of
the 4th article of the constitution? If they had so understood it,
would they have agreed to the adoption of the constitution?

If there was one feeling, more than any other, which marked the
conduct of southern men at the time of the adoption of the federal
constitution, it was extreme jealousy and distrust of the northern and
eastern sections of this union on the subject of slavery. The pro-
ceedings of each of the conventions, south of the Potomac, which
adopted the constitution, demonstrate this too clearly for doubt. All
must admit, that no constitution would have been acceded to by a
solitary southern state, which did not contain the amplest guarantee
of property in slaves. The caution which our southern statesmen
manifested on this subject was set down, at the time, to the score of
idle fears and ungenerous jealousy. But among the numerous in-
stances in which they discovered a sagacity and wisdom almost more
than human, not one was more remarkable than this. With a saga-
city which partook of prescience, they descried the dangers with
which we are at present environed, and they provided against them
by provisions in the constitution itself, as far as they could be relied
upon, and by a reservation of all the means of protection which un-
impaired sovereignty can afford when these should prove ineffectual.

The southern states demanded that a clause should be inserted in
the constitution, providing for the capture of fugitive slaves. Could
men who required a provision of that sort, have been guilty of the in-
consistency and absurdity of agreeing to a constitution under which
any one of the distrusted states could produce a condition of things
in which, although there would be an obligation to send back to his
bondage, the slave who had fled from his master to gain his liberty,
yet the felon who should steal him from this very master, might go
acquit? Such fatuity might be looked for in madmen, but not in a