Microfilm Reel 195, File 64, "Russia"

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All the microfilm scans from the file number 64, "Russia," on reel 195 from the Executive Office files of the Woodrow Wilson Papers, series 4 in the Library of Congress finding aid.

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The special cable dispatches from Moscow that are here presented are reprinted from the columns of The Chicago Daily News, which received them from Louis Edgar Browne, its staff correspondent in Russia. Mr. Browne has been in the thick of events in that distracted country since the first days of the provisional government which came into existence soon after the downfall of the czar. These dispaiches— which were almost the last to come out of Russia before German infiuences seriously affected the telegraph lines in Finland—throw much new light on obscure points in the recent history of the new republic. They also outline a program of action for the United States government that in the opinion of Mr. Browne and certain other Americans now in Moscow would rescue Russian democracy from the sinister designs of Germany and might even cause Russia once more to become a positive factor in the war against the central powers. This program, with the facts and views on which it is based, manifestly is entitled to receive careful consideration from the authorities in Washington, from American business interests and from the American public generally.

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I. DEFECTS OF THE KERENSKY GOVERNMENT.

SPECIAL CABLE TO THE DAILY NEWS (Copyright. 1918. The Chicago Daily News Co.) Moscow, Russia, April 11.—Three years ago visionaries in the allied nations dreamed that Berlin would fall before the Russian steam roller. To-day the same visionaries, now pessimists, condemn Russia as a quitter among the nations, not seeing in this vast country a future aid in the world war for democracy. The majority of newspaper readers in the allied countries probably suspect or believe that the Russian soviet government sold out to Germany and that the soviet leaders are paid agents of the kaiser. These are equally fatuous ideas.

False interpretations of facts and rumors that are cabled to the varions allied countries regarding the revolution have confused and misled many students of political movements, whose judgment of the situation has been accepted as final. Thus there exists a tendency in the allied countries to abandon Russia as a hopeless liabllity, such action being excused by frequent reiteration of the theory that the soviet leaders are German agents.

In the last six months no definite policy toward Russia that might have been adopted by the allies would have changed Russia from a bad liability to a substantial asset. Now six months of disastrous revolutionary adventure have put a new complexion on the situation.

Aroused by German Duplicity.

We in Russia who are actually in contact with the soviet Government discern the possibility of Russis's again becoming a contributing member of the allies' coalition. We see the soviet government a real power with a firm grip on the internal situation. We see the soviet government furious because of the shameful peace Germany forced upon it. We see the soviet's growing resentment against Germany. We feel the sentiment of the

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Russian people harden against Germany. We see this resentment crystallizing in Russia's efforts to create a revolutionary army and the hurried evacuation of munitions to depots beyond the Volga in preparation for the expected resumption of German attacks.

Above all, we feel that new revolutionary spririt demanding war against Germany, which spirit is the direct result of the growing conviction of the Russian masses that Germany menaces the existence of free Russia. We realize that the Russian debacle was a catastrophe to the allies and that it prolonged the war. This is ample reason for assisting Russia to recover some of her lost prestige.

How Can the Allies Aid Russia?

How much the allies may expect of Russia depends entirely upon two things:

First, how well we foster the spirit of resentment against Germany, and,

Second, how efficiently and materially we aid the soviet government in its effort to put Russia on a war basis.

The Russian situation, when one views the possibilities it is likely to have and the interest it will excite among the allied peoples in the next months, is such that I feel the necessity of outlining the conclusions drawn by the controlling group representing the allies in Russia from the teachings of the last seven months of Russian history. Save for insignificant exceptions, American diplomatic and military representatives indorse the main ideas expressed in the series of cable dispatches that I am sending to the Daily News, of which this is the first.

Faults of the Kerensky Government.

Whe the American missions began cooperating with Alexander Kerensky two glaring faults were disclosed in the provisional government.

First, that government was built on the foundations of the old regime. This meant that the new socialistic order was trying to utilize the bars of bureaucracy.

Second, the provisional government was utterly unable to organize the country's food supply. Although American investigation proved that Russia had sufficient food to feed herself, the cumbersome

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routine of the autocracy proved too inelastic to meet the demands of the revolution. Wherever Kerensky turned he found hostility; whatever he tried to do met with passive resistance, which was as effective as active opposition.

Old Bureaucracy Fought Kerensky.

The allies' military and technical units complained of lack of progress. A member of the American railway mission said: "We cannot help the Russians if they will not help themselves." Kerensky's government stirred up the inertia of the old regime, but the machinery was slowing down. The inability of the provisional government to handle the food situation was largely due to the rottenness of the governmental mechanism, and it furnished all of Kerensky's enemies with a common target for attack. Extensive co-operation was necessary, but the corrupt bureauracy did not respond to Kerenskys efforts.

Kerensky's Position was made more difficult by the war speculators. The American mission found the food prices entirely disproportionate to the cost of other commodities. Prices of manufactured articles were inflated to ten or a dozen times the normal prices, while the price of food was arbitrarily decreed at thrice its normal value. Result: The peasants refused to exchange foodstuffs for currency because of the distortion of the normal relative values. They preferred to barter grain for absolutely needed manufactured articles, hoarding their surplus grain.

Shorn of Power by the Soviet.

If Kerensky had actually possessed the power he might have oiled up the old machine and solved the food difficulty. But Kerensky was without power. The soviet had usurped it. Visible at every turn, alternately leading and frustrating the provisional government, was the soviet. It was virile and active, although as yet openly unobtrusive. The soviet's power was the direct result of gigantic propaganda that had already won over with timeworn formulas large groups of soldiers and the peasant masses.

Whenever Kerensky's duma moved it encountered the solid substance of the

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soviet power. A clash invariably resulted and the soviet invariably won. Then America entered the game. This was in August.

American Red Cross at Work.

America sent a Red Cross mission to Russia which, under the force of circumstances, erected itself into a polltical mission. This unofficial effort mitigated the mistake which all the allies made regarding the new Russia. For purposes of war the various allied nations selected as their representatives in Russia men who through temperament and training were fitted to work in harmony with the czar's autocratic regime. The revolution came and practically none of these representatives was replaced by a man more in tune with the situation. The old representatives of the allies were as much out of sympathy with the new socialistic order as were the supporters of the overthrown autocracy.

The American Red Cross mission—now almost wholly a political mission—realized that when the czar fell the fundamental bond of Russian life was lost and there existed no common unity of patriotism to hold Russia together. The Russian people lived for the czar and warred for the czar. The ideals of patriotism crystallized in the czar's person. Some new bond was essential. It was necessary to create patriotism or something representing patriotism. Throughout Russia were scores of groups acting individually with no apparent desire for cohesion.

Vision of the American Mission.

The American mission believed that attempts to re-establish the old bond were foredoomed to failure, because under it only about 6 per cent of the population had a real stake in the nation, while since the revolution 90 per cent had tasted freedom and ownership. There existed a solid mass of 15,000,000 soldiers against the re-establishment. Thus the Kornloff, Kaledines and Alexieff moves were destined to fallure, although this was better realized after a few bitter experiences.

Russia's need of a new bond suggested to the American mission a definite course of action—namely, amalgamation and continued co-operation of the political

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and military elements of the new Russia as a preliminary essential; then the inauguration of a vast educational campaign seeking to create a new patriotic unity in an ideal of "a free Russia, land for the peasants, freeholds and firesides." Nothing could be done without the coalition of the military and political elements, which had been growing more estranged. Consequently the Korniloff plot was hatched.

Leaf from the French Revolution.

The plan interested the American mission. The Korniloff-Kerensky amalgamation was first to solve the food problem, which furnished the main basis of attack against the Kerensky government, and then co-operate in educating the soldiers and peasants as to Germany's true character. It was hoped that the effort would culminate in the creation of a Russian revolutionary army, the counterpart in spirit of the French revolutionary army.

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II. THE DOWNFALL OF KERENSKY.

SPECIAL CABLE TO THE DAILY NEWS. [Copyright, 1918, the Chicago Daily News Co.]

Moscow, Russia, April 12.—On Aug. 18k 1917, members of the American Red Cross mission attended a conference, at which Kerensky, Savinkoff, Nekrassoff and Skebeloff discussed with them the details of a coup d'etat to effect and amalgamation of the Korniloff and Kerensky forces. The next day Kerensky, Korniloff and the American mission met in the Winter palace and further discussed details of the plan. All urged its speedy execution, as the soviet's attacks because of the food situation and also the soviet's peace campaign were rapidly undermining the positions of both Kerensky and the allies in Russia.

Kerensky and Korniloff agreed to join forces and co-operate with the United States. They agreed to meet the pressing food difficulty by appointing M. Batolin food dictator. Batolin was the Russian wheat magnate whose wizardlike foresight and almost superhuman powers of organization enabled him to become probably the largest single human factor in Russia's industrial and commercial life, despite the handicap of his birth in a peasant's hovel.

Hoover Was to Be a Factor.

The tentative economic agreement between Russia and America proposed that Mr. Hoover and other allied food specialists should be brought into the conference. America was to export to Russia certain foodstuffs in exchange for platinum and other metals, beet seed, flax and hides. Kerensky and Korniloff agreed jointly to sign a proclamation to America's name. They were to conduct a ruthless campaign against speculators, invoking the death penalty, if necessary. Both Kerensky and Korniloff were hopeful. They laid great stress on the necessity of America's co-operation.

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Despite the urgent need of immediate action, the plan hung fire unil the American mission, recognizing the soviet's rapidly rising power, advised Korniloff and Kerensky to abandon the plan entirely. Korniloff and Kerensky obstinately refused. Then came their attempt. As a coup d'etat a more miserable fiasco was never seen. Everything went wrong. But the failure was no mystery. It was the soviet which, learning of the plot, sprang into activity, showing unsuspected depths of organization.

Soviet's Coup Was Well Planned.

Overnight the soviet's power became a factor of equal consideration with that of the provisional government. This was not accidental. It was the culmination of weeks of untiring and skillful leadership. The Kerensky-Korniloff plot and the soviet counterplot popped simultaneously. Kronstadt sailors hurried to Petrograd under the thin pretext of guarding Kerensky. The sailors surrounded the winter palace, virtually held Kerensky a prisoner and forced him to repudiate his piedges to Korniloff. They forced him to sign a decree denouncing Korniloff as a counter-revolutionary. The movement was crushed in twenty-four hours.

The soviet's maneuvers opened a new phase of the situation which disclosed Kerensky's lack of power. They made plain the fact that Kerensky was running a socialistic government with the machinery of an autocracy and was thus building on a false foundation. A wholly socialistic organization was striving to overthrow both Kerensky and Korniloff. On the one hand Kerensky talked the old world politics and diplomacy of the allies; on the other he shouted the most radical and excited views of the Russian masses. The two things did not mix. The opposition was the soviet conducting revolutionary, socialistic antiwar propaganda. Its formula, "peace, land and bread," was sweet music to the Russian ear, being just what it wanted to hear.

Captivated Army of 15,000,000.

Kerensky's declaration, "We will fight until the bitter end," did not stand a show. Paychologically the arguments of

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