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tting the particular case under consideration. I might have stopped with the enrollment, as that was prior to his appointment as Deputy Sheriff (which I understand to be the ground upon which he claims exemption. From that time, he was in the Military service of the Confederate States, beyond the possibility of doubt, & could not be withdrawn from that service without the consent of the government of that States. And this view is distinctly prevented in your proclamation of the 9^th May—before cited—in which you say, "As no person can be with drawn from the service of the State without the consent of the State, so no one can be withdrawn from the Military service of the Con-federate States after being duly enrolled, or enlisted. Election, or appointment to office, after such enrollments, therefore, can not exempt."

It is not in the power of the citizen by secreting himself, or Jail-ing to report in enrollment, or in any other way, to change this status, or obligation under one of those acts, by the exemptions contained in a subsequent one. The obligation is a continuing one, during the period fixed by the act to which he owes service. Only the authority—viz—(Congress, (or the President, or the Secretary of War, in the exercise of the power conferred upon them by Congress) which imposed the obligation, can remove it. The enrolling officers have only ministerial or Executive duties to perform under the conscript laws. Those laws have declared who owes military duty. Those officers are appointed to see that the debt is paid. They have no power to [?] it when it is due, nor have the power even to say Now payment shall be made, nor to compromise the same by details, extension of time for payment, or otherwise. Payment in kind to wit by the service required by the act will alone satisfy the law.

Applying what Ihave said to you 1^st. is interogatory, which is a general one it is easy to perceive, that in my opinion, " the right of exemption of State, County or District Officers elected