22

Filed June 12/18

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[floating text: j?]

After an analysis of the Russian situation,
in which the President would find much of his own
thought expressed, Mr. Browne suggests a programme,
substantially as follows:

1. The Allies must decide whether the soviet
government is really a power in Russia; then, if
it is, they must begin immediate cooperation with
that government. Mr. Browne goes to show that the
soviet government is a power. "It has how been in
undisputed power for five months without serious
armed oppositions except in the Ukraine, where the
reactionary rada, mortgaged to Germany, is bolstered
up by German divisions. The soviet elements in the
Ukraine are conducting an active guerrilla warfare
against the German and rada troops. They retook
Odessa. The authority off the soviet extends from
Petrograd to Vladivostok and from Archangel to
Baku. Only German or Japanese bayonets will pre-
vent this soviet power from lasting many months
longer."

"Recognitfon (of the soviet) is not absolutely
essential. It desires the Allies' recognition more
then anything else in the world, but next it de-
sires the Allies’ cooperation.

"The soviet asks the aid of American and French
officers in organizing a new revolutionary army; also
aid in removing large stores of military munitions
beyond the Volga, where they would be out of reach
of the Germans should the latter again advance."

2. We should foster and encourage the resentment
which is already crystallizing in Russia against
Germany, and also encourage the revolutionary spirit
for war.

3. We should make no concerted invasion of
Siberia and should not permit Japan to invade Siberia.
Such an invasion would imediately result in the
turning of Russian resentment away from Germany and
against the Allies. "If we are able to assure the

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