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examination; and then having acted upon that hasty answer throughout, it has naturally lost all practical importance, and so never does get any serious consideration. If they were to analyze the case which they fancy sustains their notion of reciprocal dependence, they would see that, far from sustaining that idea, it is quite opposed to it. A student of one subject say Dr. A may go to a student of another subject, say Dr. B, and ask him a question and make use of his answer; and subsequently the one Dr. B who gave the answer may ask a question of Dr. A, and if it be a wholly independent question there is no reason why he should not derive solid information
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from him. But the idea that Doctors A and B can each supply the other with the very same information or with information virtually the same is ridiculous. I maintain that no two sciences can depend, each upon results of the other for principles without which it cannot exist as a science. Now all the special sciences,—in particular, dynamics the most fundamental of the physical sciences and the doctrine science of association the most fundamental of the psychical sciences, both— depend for their existence as sciences upon principles which only metaphysics can the metaphysician can properly discuss. To show how differently the ultra empiricists think, I will quote a sentence from the second edition of Wundt's 'System der Philosophie.' He says: "Ich muss zugeben: wenn man es als ein Axiom betrachtet,
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metaphysische Systeme müssten unabhängig von allen von allen Einflüssen des Einzelwissens, so zu sagen durch eine wissenschaftliche generatio aequivoca, entstehen, so lässt sich gegen jene Meinung nicht viel einwenden. In der That glaube ich, dass es einen Unterschied macht, wo man anfängt, und wo man af aufhört. Da ich von den Naturwissenschaften ausgegangen und dann duch durch di Beschäftigung mit empirische Psychologie zur Philosophie gekommen bin, so würde es mir unmöglich erscheinen anders zu philsophiren als nach eine Methode, die dieser Folge der Probleme entspricht." It is that slur about the generatio aequivoca that I wish to call attention to, which implies that a proposition doctrine which is not based upon such methods of scientific research is has no sound upon a result of one of the Einzelwissenschaften, or
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basis at all special sciences, has no basis at all. Now all such results depend upon logical principles without which no special science would have any credibility. at al It would therefore follow that logical principles are based on nothing at all, and that the special sciences which are based on those baseless principles have no solid basis, were it not that he Wundt thinks that Logic and the Special Sciences, like two lying witnesses in court, sustain each other's credit. But according to me there are certain principles that no man doubts,—that you do not doubt in the least degree. Very vague, I confess, or rather insist, that they are; but still not entirely nonsensical; and that it is upon these
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principles of Common Sense that Logic and all Cenoscopy must rest; and since they are absolutely indubitable there can be no consistent dissatisfaction with them. These are not results of any special science, but on the contrary, antecede all scientific research and are taken for granted by all scientists. For scientific men are not sophists and wranglers over nothing, but are eminently men of Common Sense, that is of Human Instinct, beyond the gates of which it is impossible for men to push their criticism. I could not ask for more convincing support of this Common Sensism than is furnished by the ultra-empiricist Ernst Mach in his book "Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung historisch-kritisch dargestellt."