MS 434 (1902) - Minute Logic - Chapter IV

Logic IV. 59 The first point we notice in the Phaedo is that the philosophic man will not be eager for the so called pleasures such as eating and drinking. [Foreign language text] He would wish to shun carnal matters and to be busied with the soul. Even the best of the senses are deceptive. The reality of things becomes manifest if at all only in reasoning. [Foreign text]. Then next it is agreed that there is a being just in the abstract [foreign text]. And so with being true and being good. There is no sense perception of these "I speak of entire class, greatness, health, strength, et cetera." [Foreign text] The body is therefore an impediment. Preferring

Logic IV. 60 one pleasure to another or one pain to another is not virtue. There is only one genuine coin for which everything should be sold, wisdon. [Foreign text]. The first argument for immortality is that oscillation is a universal phenomenon so that one may expect a return from death to life. After sleeping a making After making a sleep Life death overtakings Deep underneath deep. Were there no return movement everything would have [we?] [this]? passed in the final form. We note in passing a reference to [foreign text] "The argument which you yourself Socrates so often urge that such knowledge as we have in nothing but reminiscence." This sounds to me to be just on his level although one must acknowledge that it is also very much like Plato. In pursuing this idea,

Logic IV. 61 the writer points out distinctly the two principal forms of associational suggestions which was always and quite correctly termed reminiscence before Hume that is to say by contiguity and by reason glance. [Foreign text]

Logic IV. 62 [foreign text]. Now you know that lovers when they see a lyre or cloak or anything which their darling has been used to employ undergo the same experience. They recognize they lyre and in their minds they receive the image of the boy to wrhom they lyre belongs? And this is reminiscence? So anybody seeing Simmias may ofttimes be reminded of Cebes and myriad other such instances there are. Myriads indeed mon Dieu said Simmias. Now said he such a things is a reminiscence is it not? Especially however when a person experiences this concerning that which owing to the lapse of time and to not paying attention he had already forgotten? Quite so he said. But said he can it happen that from seeing a [horse?] delineated and a lyre delineated that one recollects a man or from seeing Simmias delineated to recollect Cebes. Perfectly. Also on seeing Simmias delineated to recollect Simmias himself? It happens said he. Unfortunately the word translated delineation being [foreign text] on all four occurences it may

Logic IV. 63 possibly be that written words mere meant. Now having reach suggestions by resemblance Plato reasons very strangely. He notes that the resemblance is never perfect. Yet we are quite sure that there is such a relationas absolute resemblance thoughwe never experience it. Where did weget the idea. It mush be reminiscence of a previous life. I may remark that this of course is absurd because having by experience the ideas of greater and less resemblance we have but to combine them differently to get the idea of perfect resemblance. For example having got the idea of subtraction from experience we hav only to think of subtracting the whole of a quantity to get the idea of zero and having the idea of zero and of difference in fewer respects we readily get the idea of difference in no respect. But even in cases where we have no such experiential ways of reaching an idea we may still reach it by the suggestions of the language of other symbols we use. The most I have translated by perfect resemblance