MS 447-454 (1903) - Lowell Lecture I

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what seemed to be good reasoning wete goog reasoning, I reply that according to my description of the phenomena od reasoning, the only fact which the soundness of all reasoning and the truth of all human thought really depends is that a man's conjectures are somewhat better than purely random propositions. The idea that the criticism of the criticism of reasoning involves some new reasoning overlooks the fact that the criticism is sustained by the original inference. "Reasoning, says Hobbes, is computation", and although the criticism of the criticism of reasoning simply repeats the process, like adding up a column of figures a second time. It is conceivable that a blunder should be repeated, but after the column has been added, say ten times, and always with the same result, the aeithmetician has no longer any discernible doubt to be quieted; and

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to add the column an eleventh time would be quite purposeless. In a strict theoretical sense, it is not certain that twice two are four, since it is conceivable that a blunder that might occur once has occured everytime the addition has been performed.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I think you will agree that the defendent argument is a throughly bad one, and in particular that question of what is good of whether the mind approves it or not, but is a question of fact. A method that tends to carry us towards the truth more speedily than we would otherwise progress is good; a method that has a tendency to carry us away from the truth is utterly bad whether we approve of it or not, although I hope you will agree with me in this, I shall only applaud you if you feel a certain hesitation owing to its not been apparent what past feeling plays either in the process of moral control or in the process

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I have avoided the consideration of the great question of the connection of body and soul to which philosophy is to alive today. I have not asked how a believe can be transmuted into a mental formula nor how a mental formula can produce s determination of one's being. If I had time, I could have thrown light on this question; but I have avoided that expense of time, because it is not strictly necessary.

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of reasoning. Here we come to a question concerning which every upto date philosopher of today, though he may incline to one opinion or another, feels uncertain. It is the question of the connection of soul and body. I will say a few words about it, in order to make it clear to you precisely what the question is.

During the last three centuries the positions of planets and comets have constantly observed with precision; and it has invariably been remarked that when any two of them have happened to come near to one another, the motions of the two but especially that of the smaller one have recieved component accelerations towards each other. Now nobody thinks or can think, that that has been a mere coincidence. For seven generations have watched the planets since propounded the general formula which has never failed to express just the amount of that acceleration. The sense of that formula is not a thing, nor is it any existing fact about things; because it expressed what things will do as well as what they have done. Some formulae have proved merely depressions of how facts have happened express mere coincidences; for when predictions were pased upon them, those predictions were often falsified. This formula on the other hand, has

I should say that to speak to you about that. I could give you a much clearer notion of the nature of the problem than you can find in any book; and it would greatly elucidate the real nature of reasoning. But the limitation of my time forbids.