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serious attempt to combat the soviet's
peace propaganda and explain to the
Russian people why Germany really
menaced their newly won freedom. Sev-
enty per cent of the Russian masses are
uneducated, according to western stan-
dards No one ever told the Russian
masses about the German menace. How
can we expect them to understand it ex-
cept through experience? It seemed as
though the allied representatives were
completely oblivious of the growing pow-
er of the soviet.

Meanwhile the soviet's power was
strengthening and the soviet formulas
undermined the allied influence. Keren-
sky became weaker and weaker. The al-
lied political and military missions, ex-
cept the American Red Cross and politi-
cal mission, completely misunderstanding
the situation, charge Kerensky with
ruining the army and misusing the allies'
confidence.

Allies' Stiff Note to Kerensky.

It will be remembered that on the eve
of Kerensky's downfall that the allied am-
bassadors, excepting the American am-
bassador, who had received no instruc-
tions, presented Kerensky with a stiff
note of protest, amounting almost to an
ultimatum against conditions in Russia.
This note is part of the secret treaty
publications. The allies hindered and per-
secuted Kerensky, whereas an active ef-
fort to explain why Germany menaced
Russia might have frustrated the nar-
cotic effect of the soviet's formulas.

Three days before the soviet's coup
d'etat was delivered a conference was
held. Kerensky met the allied military
representatives in the rooms of the
American mission. He declared that he
commanded the support of four Petrograd
regiments, perhaps enough to defeat the
soviet forces, but Kerensky refused to
remain in power unless he was assured
by the allies of full support for the
Russian policy, which Kerensky himself
dictated. He was tired of telling the
allies what they insisted on hearing
through the mouth of the silver tongued
Terestchenko while he himself was telling
the Russian people something quite
different.

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Instead of discussing a concrete plan
for downing the soviet, the military re-
resentatives indulged in a general de-
nunciation of the policy of the provi-
sional Government and each painful detail
of the Tarnopol and Riga retreats. Ker-
ensky admitted all these charges, but he
did not see how he could have changed
events.

No Constructive Action Taken.

Every attempt to reach an understand-
ing resulted in mutual recrimination.
The meeting lasted two hours, and despite
the urgent pressure of the American
mission not a single constructive action
was taken. The allied missions favored
supporting Kaledines and Alexieff as
against Kerensky. They scouted the pos-
sibility that the soviet might overthrow
the provisional government. Yet this
virile soviet organization had swept be-
fore it every military unit, village and
community into which it penetrated. It
had overcome obstacle after obstacle,
defeated Korniloff, gained the support
of the majority of the bayonets at the
front and assumed control of the Baltic
and Kronstadt fleets.

The allied military missions hardly
sensed this power. Yet Kerensky re-
iterated the necessity of the allies trust-
ing him to deal exclusively with the
Russian situation. Kerensky's demand
was not answered

Blow Fails; Flight of Kerensky.

Then came the blow. In five days all
was over and Kerensky fled, a hunted
fugitive. The allies then faced a new
situation. The soviet controlled the
government, the rifles and the masses.
The soviet's program pledged Russia to
the formula of peace. The soviet had
what Kerensky never had—power—the
reason being that the soviet promised the
Russian People just what the Russian
people wanted, namely, peace, land and
bread. How to utilize this new situation
as a factor in winning the world war for
the allies became the burning problem of
the day.

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