5

upon Metaphysics. It is when they promise themselves
that they will not make any metaphysical assumptions
that they are most in danger of slipping too deep into the
metaphysical slough for deliverances, precisely because one cannot
exercise control and criticism of what one does
unconsciously. At a later stage of our logical studies this
dependence of nomology upon metaphysics will apear
very evident. As to Metaphysics, if the theory of logic
which is to be developed in this book has any truth,
the position of the two greatest of all metaphysicians,
Aristotle and Kant, will herein be supported by saltisfac-
tory proof, that that science can only rest directly upon
the theory of logic. Indeed, it may be said that there has
hardly been a metaphysician of the first rank who has not
made logic his stepping stone to metaphysics.

Such is the place of logic among the sciences; and
such is its utility. Yet the reader will find that the