MS 611-15

1908 Nov 13 Logic 37

You. Oh. I have not been in the habit of thinking of characters as real things or as anything more than oblique cases of nouns.

I. But don't you reckon Priam, Cadmus, Mars, Caliban, and Titiana among Proper Names? They denote, not single existents if any it is True, but single Ideas. Now Ideas are objects none the less that some of them are not Real. I capitalize the term 'Proper Name' to show that I take it in a definite sense herein explained, and I define it as a term noun denoting anything regarded as single. In my sense, therefore, a fictitious object if regarded as single, must must be denoted, if at all, by a Proper Name.

You. Well, it does not seem worth while to contest that point, since you might say that the assertion was is equivalent to "Whatever

1908 Nov 13 Logic 38

the Interpreter may please to select, if it be in the collection of all masses of blood is in the collection of all red things. But is that the form in which we necessarily think the assertion? That seems to me to be doubtful, or more than doubtful.

I. That is very truth; but the gist of our studies, the sole point that we aim at, except as secondary, is whether or not one truth follows from another. Now this depends on what the fact is that our assertions represent and not on the form of the thinking. That we may leave to be studied by psychologists. For whatever follows from all blood is red follows from the fact, in whatever form it be it be thought, and if all blood is red follows from any other assertion every form of thinking it follows or none. That is the logical point of view, which has been missed very often since Wundt's Vorlesungen

1908 Nov 14 Logic 6

Chapter I. Common Ground

I salute you, Mr Reader! Would I were about to become as well acquainted with you as you are to me. You know as well as I do that all my knowledge of things external to me comes to me through my "five senses" and as far as I (f?) am aware I never looked upon your face, nor hear your voice, nor (st?) felt your presence

1908 Nov 15 Logic 6 Chapter 1. Common Ground.

In this chapter there will be no capitalized words which are to be used in extra exact senses after being defined with great care, although analyses of conceptions will hold a high place in the other chapters. But after all, analyses cannot supersede the peculiar [???]

1908 Nov 15 Logic 6

Chapter I. Common Ground

Before a writer's mind can act upon a reader's even so far as to let the latter know what the former things, a (Greek) of common knowledge must be attained,--something familiar to both parties alike. These pages will largely be taken up with analyses of thoughts, or dissections of meanings whose results will usually be expressed in definitions. In this first chapter (?) definitions will be eschewed, and not of those terms will appear that I capitalize elsewhere in order to show that they are used in special exact senses explained by stating the elements of their intended meanings together with the ways in which those elements must be put together to form the intended meanings