20

together on the sheet. As long as we
recognize a blank as a graph, the writing scribing
of a single graph is a case of scribing two graphs
together, of which a blank is one. The second
sign is the scroll. These two are the only indispensible
signs; but we recognize as a third
sign the filling up of an area with a blot.

I just defined a permissible transformation as one
which can not produce a ?? never change a true graph to a false one one not true. Very
good. But why should we regard this
statement as constituting a definition of a permissible
transformation rather than as constituting a definition
of truth? Why might not truth be defined as that which we
can assert with impunity? If the idea of penalties for
breaking rules is more familiar to us than the idea of truth
it might not be a bad definition.

In like manner we might define the three signs of the
alpha part of existential graphs by means of permissible
what is permitted. Since every act of definition involves
two propositions,— they may be variously stated, but there will
always be two,— one for example stating that if a word is used a
certain interpretation is justified, the other stating that in
given cases the use of the word will be legitimate,— if, I say
we remember this double character of definition, we shall
see that the definitions of the three signs will give six
propositions. These six are as follows:
1st, If two graphs are together on the sheet of assertion,
either may be cancelled or erased.
2nd, If either of two graphs might be written scribed, both may be
scribed together.
[written here by Peirce: "Turn over." and under that: "Transpose second & third Rules"]

The second third rule is that a cut with nothing within is a
replica of the pseudograph and may be scribed on the
sheet of assertion with enclosed in a cut on the sheet of
assertion, while two coincident cuts may be
removed.

together on the sheet. As long as we
recognize a blank as a graph, the scribing
of a single graph is a case of scribing two graphs
together, of which a blank is one. The second
sign is the scroll. These two are the only indispensible
signs; but we recognize as a third
sign the filling up of an area with a blot.

I just defined a permissible transformation as one
which can never change a true graph to one not true. Very
good. But why should we regard this
statement as constituting a definition of a permissible
transformation rather than as constituting a definition
of truth? Why might not truth be defined as that which we
can assert with impunity? If the idea of penalties for
breaking rules is more familiar to us than the idea of truth
it might not be a bad definition.

In like manner we might define the three signs of the
alpha part of existential graphs by means of
what is permitted. Since every act of definition involves
two propositions,— they may be variously stated, but there will
always be two,— one for example stating that if a word is used a
certain interpretation is justified, the other stating that in
given cases the use of the word will be legitimate,— if, I say
we remember this double character of definition, we shall
see that the definitions of the three signs will give six
propositions. These six are as follows:
1st, If two graphs are together on the sheet of assertion,
either may be cancelled or erased.
2nd, If either of two graphs might be scribed, both may be
scribed together. [written here by Peirce: "Turn over." and under that: "Transpose second & third Rules"]

The second third rule is that a cut with nothing within is a
replica of the pseudograph and may be scribed
enclosed in a cut on the sheet of
assertion, while two coincident cuts may be
removed.