Allen, Ethan, 1738-1789. An essay on the universal plenitude of being and on the nature and immortality of the human soul and its agency : manuscript, [1784]. MS Am 1825. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

that the Soul is no substance, having in the first place began our querie whether the Soul be material or immaterial, and finding that it is not material, in the sense we have before observed we incautiously and inadvertently conclude it to be immaterial; and in our diffinition of immaterial, we illeigible (preclude the Idea of) illegible substance (from the Soul,) and consequently are divided into the material and immaterial systems; not considering that there may be, and undoubtedly is are, intelligent substances, specifically and intrincally distinct from matter, and though they are by nature immaterial, are nevertheless substantial beings, and have a capacity of whereness or of possessing place.

But this notion of spiritual substances of which the essence of inte beings exist, having altogether or too much been neglected, and contrary doctrine that mere matter composes all substances,( having been advance) by the Materialests, who argued Justly from thistheir system Immaterial substances or Souls coul have no existence, as th terial system excluded them from being. And the Imma -ests (of whom I was till lately one,) by denying the Mater -tem, in order to make way for the Intelligent existence Soul, advanced the doctrine of its Immateriality, and ra the egregious blunder of denying the soul the property of substance at all; and consequently the property of posses place, which militates conclusively against its existen theory; though not in practice and fact, (and it is a ma in law that facts are stubborn things,) and since in fact have an Intelligent existence, we are obliged as philosop to ascribe such properties to that part of our nature, as manifestly consistent therewith and (essential to it,) and deny to it such incompatible to its being: and since in fact, if the soul ex anywhere, it exists in some place, and if so, it must h property of substance wherewith to occupy the sam is manifestly chimerical to ascribe the notion of place, [?] it

consist (exist either) of mere matter, or nonentity, and therefore that it consists (exists) of some substance that is not truly material.

Those who adhere to the immaterial system except they premise a real substance specifically and intrinsically different from mere matter, of which the Soul exists, do by consequence (though not design -edly) preclude the existence of the Soul; since place is necessary to existence, and substance is essen -tial to possess or occupy (place). And on the other hand, those who maintain the material system, by necessary consequence preclude intelligence from the Soul, for that matter is incogitative and passive. And thus both systems seem to militate against the existence of the Soul, the former, by not including in their Idea of the Soul any kind of substance, whereby it could exist, and the latter, by ascribing to it no other substance but matter only, which by nature is incapable (of) reflection and consciousness, and thereby negative the intelligence of the Soul. These with other considerations exhibited in the following discourse, induced me to premise that the Soul existed of a specific kind of spiritual substance, which, however imperceptible to itself through the medium of sense, is nevertheless a real substance, since the Soul, in this life, has an actual existence in and possession of the body: we will therefore indeavor to investigate its essence as far as it may be in our power.

What has been hinted at in the introduction may serve,

to prepare the mind of the reader for the reception of the following arguments on this subject.

Oracles

Chapter I

Section I

Of the essence of the Soul, and of cogitative and incogitative entity in general.

It may be a matter of doubt whether the wisdom (of) man, in this weak condition of being and action, is able to elucidate so intricate a subject (as that of the essence of the Soul;) but as human science and knowledge ins progressive, we can not determine to what attainments it may or may not arrive. A candid examination therefore into any part of nature, orcannot be this disserviceable to us. If we make any new discoveries, we are wiser than we were before; and if we do not succeed in the investigation of the nature of the Soul (or) of universal entity, we shall have done the most that we could do to discover the truth, and shall have the satisfaction of reflecting that had we not been this inquisitive we should not have improved so far in knowledge as to have known but that we might have gone further: we will therefore proceed with our inquiry into the essence of the Soul.

The question, as we shall manage it, will not be whether the Soul be material or immaterial but whether the Soul is a real substance or not.

common

of Reason

common sense assures us that those illegible parts of entity that come within our observation, which we call matter, does not think, but is (by) nature incapable of reflection and consciousness; and since the Soul is by nature capable of these intelligent exertions, we may with certainty infer that the soul is not material; and if not material why not immaterial. In a strict sense it may be immaterial, or void of matter, but not in such a sense as to exempt it from substance; since, without substance, it would be incapable of possessing or occupying place; which, if true, it could not possess or occupy the Body, which we know to be in fact true.

That there is a union between Soul and body, is a fact that none that have Souls and bodies will dispute, but that an animal body should be united with a Soul or Spirit of no substance is contradictory and impossible. It is the same as to join or unite nothing with something, which is manifestly absurd. But it may be premised, that the illegible being called Soul, though void of substance, is nevertheless intelligent, but such a querie as this would be beging the question, for that intelligence implies being as much as anything else. None will dispute but that the Soul is intelligent, but the dispute is whether it is a real substance or not. The point to be proved on the part of my opponents, if I shall have any, is that the Soul may exert itself intelligently, or consciously, without substance, or that an intelligent being may be, and that its essence may be void of substance, which appears to me

to

Oracles

to be the same as to suppose that nonentity may exert (or do acts of) intelligence and consciousness; for there can be no attribute, property, or quality, to a premised being or Soul, void of substance; any more than to nonentity. for instance we will examine into the manner of the exist(e)nce of such a premised being. Is it local or boundless; has it a whereness or ubiquity: admitting it to be local, it must of necessary consequence have a circumpherence, and a circumpherence necessarily implies a real exten tion, and illegible extention a substance, however inconceiv -able to us, (by reason of its subtile purity,) to occupy the contents of that extention, as nonentity could not do it. And on the contrary to premise ascribe ubiquity or omnipresence to it, would be a contradiction to its finitude or locallity, as none but the infinite mind can be omnipresent, (of which more will be observed in its order.) From hence we infer that an intelligent finite being, perfectly exempted from all manner or kind of substance, can be neither bounded or unbounded and therefore could have no real existence, since there can be no being that has a positive existence but must come within one or the other of the descriptions of bounded and or unbounded existence, (the latter of which is only aplicable (to) God,) for there can be no third discrip -tion of existence in the universe, that does not belong to the character (of either) bounded or unbounded, limited or unlimited; and since the Soul has has a conscious kno -ledge of a finite existence, we infer that its essence must exist of some real substance though it be ever so etherial, elect electrical, subtile, vivid and pure,

or