Allen, Ethan, 1738-1789. An essay on the universal plenitude of being and on the nature and immortality of the human soul and its agency : manuscript, [1784]. MS Am 1825. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

We must conceive of things as they are in nature or else we deceive ourselves. Nature will not conform to our notions, traditions, parties or prejudices, but we must in our conceptions and Judgment of things conform to nature, which is the standard of truth and reality. We know but lit-tle of things, yet with cando(u)r, application, and a sincere desire after truth, we may improve our understandings in the knowledge of nature; much farther than at (at) our commencing studdients we could (have imagined.) concieved of Undoubtedly in a bar of Iron there are vacuums not replete with Iron, but a vacuum of nonentity is is impossible to be. The particles of ponderous mallable matter or substances, which to our senses appear to be closely conjealed, which we call solid, we through the medium of glasses found to be full of po(r)es and the vacuums in Iron or (in) other such like substances, between the particles, form little valleys, while the gross particles swell comparit(i)vely into little hills. These concavities or vacuums in conjealed bodies, do not constitute nonentity, for if there was nothing between the respective particles, they would touch each other and become solid, and could not be crouded any closer together by the mallable application (of a hammer to it,) for if a bar of Iron was perfectly solid, (though we cannot conceive of it to (be) really so,) it could not admit of a vacuum (for), perfect solidity would exclude it. We may premise a real solidity, and abstractedly reason on

such

such a thisis, though at the same time it is to us uncertain or improbable, that there (should be) is any such thing in the Universe. And since by Human art, (which is very far from discovering the internal essence of things), we perceive by our senses the rough uneven susarface of the hardest and most conjealed substances that we (are) acquainted with; and as the vacuums therein discovered or premised to be, cannot (c)ontain nothing, consequently they contain something, whatever it is, or however out of the discovery of our senses. We are apt to confound our notion of entity, when speculating of a premised sirsurface of Iron, or other ponderous substances, by concluding that the vacuum in Iron, are by consequence vacuums of in entity, which is not so. It is true there are vacuums in Iron entity, but not of all kinds of entity, for nonentity is the absence of entity, which negative of being could not keep any bodies or parts of badies apart, but as we have before observed, would cause all congealed dense bodies to (would necessarily) touch, so as to constitute a perfect solidity of all its parts, since mere nothing could not separate them ofor keep them apart. But it may be said that there is more entity in a piece of Iron, than in a piece of wood of the same dimentions, as the Iron will out-way (weigh) the wood. but when we nicely consider these specific kinds of substances,

we

we shall find as we have before observed, that the whole contents of the piece of Iron does not consist of Iron only, as there are vacuums in it of other entity besides that of Iron; the same may be observed in wooden entity, that the piece before aluded to, does not consist merely of wood, since there are larger vacuums of wood in it than in the piece of Iron of equal dimentions, and consequently pertakes more of other invisible specific entity than the piece of Iron, as the vacuums in wood are (larger) illegible than of those of the Iron, hence we infer, that the known and unknow(n) specific sorts of entity, or being, are so (i)ntermixed or interspersed together; that they cannot be (by us) construed comprehended separately or distinctly. It is true that according to our common (notion) of weight, the piece of Iron will outweigh the piece of wood and admitting that some specific sorts of entity that are perceptible to our senses, are heavier than others of the (same) bulk or dimentions, yet it would not follow from hence, that there would be more entity in the piece of Iron than in the piece of wood their illegible being equal for mere weight can have (no reference to entity in general. Some sort of beings wholly escape the perception of our senses, which through the medium of glasses become visible, and yet are incapable of weigh or measure by our kind of schales (or measures) nor is it at all improbable that

there

are there should be millions of specific or distinct sorts of real entity, (of the incogitative nature) that not only are imperceptible to our senses, but to our senses assisted by instruments of human art, which we may readily perceive to be inadiquate sorts of beings to operate on the beam of a steelyard or scales, (as well as intelligent entity in general.) We may as well measure a triangle by sound, as to (weigh) every of the specific sorts of being in the uni(ve)rse, thoug(h) some sort of beings are by nature capable of weight and measure. The quantity of a (re are a) great variety of (articles of) barter and sale, and which by nature (are) capable of being calculated and estimated by the pound, as in the instance of Lead or Silver, but as has been observed before, the space that is possessed by these and such like bodies; to the limit of their respective circumpherences, is not replete with Lead or Silver, & the like illegible is true of (all) other dense bodies. If the Lead or Silver is premi -sed to be absolutely solid, it would exclude all other specific or different natured entity fr(o)m the limit of their respective circumpherences, which might rightly be denominated Lead, or Silver entity, as there could be no alloy of other sort of being (within their contents,) but as Silver or Lead is, (in its present state), there are vacuums not repleat with either Silver or Lead, within (the) circumpherences of those bodies, these vacuums makes compose no part of the one or the other of those bodies, and consequently do not exist of Silver or Lead, yet they exist of something if they exist at all

for

for (that) to exist of nothing is a contradiction, and to exist of something, is the same as to be, or possess entity, which excludes the notion of (an empty) vacuum, and establishes the Doctrine of a plenum in the premised circumpherences of the bodies of Silver and Lead before mentioned, and from the same parity of reasoning, would do the same throughout the universe.

Should we will premise an empty void a certain void in the creation of a greater or less circumpherence, yet we should be obliged in our Idea of it, to bound it on the edge of entity or of being or not limit it at all, for a premised line of circumpherence in nonentity could be no where, for Space or place are relative Ideas, and have no other existence that than what is derived from the pos-session or occupancy of real being, (of some sort or other) to which they are relative. To imagine a place or Space in in nothing is an Idle fantom of the brain without reality, for mere nothing is incapable of place or extention, so that there could not be either a great or less circumpherence in it. We may have premised such a circumpherence as before observed upon, but when we come to reason on the abstracted position of it, we find that there can be no positive existence of place or Space abstractedly considered from being or entity to which they refer, nor can there be any possible degrees in nothing, so that a greater

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