Allen, Ethan, 1738-1789. An essay on the universal plenitude of being and on the nature and immortality of the human soul and its agency : manuscript, [1784]. MS Am 1825. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

specifically distinct from matter.

Our organized senses are not so accute in the discovery of external objects, as (without experiments) we are apt to imagine. Let us observe the rays of light shining into a House through a breach or window, and in the limit of their direction we may discover a countless number of attoms or particles of matter, which out of the limit of the sun-shine (in the room), could not be perceived by the eye, then shut the window and those numerous particles (of matter) will to the eye disappear which by opening the window and admit ing the rays of light will again become visible though in any other part of the room not included in the limit of the Sun-shine those kind of attoms are not to be seen. Furthermore, human invention in constructing microscopes, tellescopes and other kinds of glasses discover to us, a numerous succession of mites and attoms in ther airy region, which without the help of glasses escape the notice of the eye, and opens to our view an astonishing variety of Worlds in the expanse of heaven, which the unassisted eye could not have discovered. But when we reflect within the limit of our own atmosphere, what a wonderfull succession of creatures, which are really possessed of animal life are are brought into view, merely by the use of those arti -fitial instruments. How surprisingly small to our gross conception of little, (which we compute merely

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by the eye) are those animals; whose existence to our coarse senses are made perceptible by the feeble efforts of human art, and how much smaller still must be the componant parts of those animals, whose circumpherence escapes the natural perception of human sight, and yet occupy such a considerable part of space, as to have a competency of room, to exert all the functions of an animal body. Furthermore, the globules of blood which impart to these (glass conceptioned) animals vital heat and strength, must every of them be compounded of an inconceivable number of still smaller particles of blood, which are still compounded of others, and so on we know not how far in the imperceptible degrees of small.

Abstracted from curious experiments and logical reasonings we are apt to think, that the natural perception of our exteral senses, represent to our minds a Just Idea of great and small, and therefore substitute them as the criterion, of the degrees of or Standard of the degrees of the size of external objects, and of strength and weakness, solidity and subtileness, but when we examine into our notions of great and small strength and weakness, solidity and subtileness, we find them to be merely comparitive. A Whale we apprehend to be great, and a Cat we apprehend to be small, yet a Cat is large compared with a Mouse, and the (Whale) appears to be small compared with a Mountain, and the Mouse large

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compared to an attom, and the Mountain small compared with the World, and the World nearly lost compared with the immensity. which farthers limit but is boundless and endless.

The extreams of great and small are not perceptible to our senses, nor comprehensible to our understanding, hence we infer, that we have no Standard whereby to assertain the true Idea of great or small, and as our senses and Ideas are inadiquate to form a Just conception of great and small, they are likewise inadiquate to form a Just Idea of the substance, illegible (or) Essence of the Soul, or of mere spiritual beings. Nevertheless it is demonstrable that they must exist of some specific substance, or not be at all, since nonentity could not give being either to the Soul, or to the extream of small, as there can be no reality or size of either great or small, to the absence of all kind of being. Therefore whatever specific intrinsic difference there may be between incogitative and cogitative beings, yet in both kind of natures and existences, there must be something, which is the same as substance, which must constitute all entity; or nonentity must have excluded entity, which if true would have prevented all disputes about it.

Our notions of Strength and weakness, solidity and subtileness are also com parative and imperfect. illegible

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The Wolf we apprehend to be strong, and the Sheep to be weak, but the Sheep is strong compared with a Snale, and the Wolf weak compared with a Lyon. Furthermore, (strength) seems to terminate in power and Wisdom and implies an ability to perform something great and wonderful, and weakness the contrary. What Power and Wisdom is displayed to our finite understanding, in the periodical revolutions of the Orbs of our Solar System, but When but when we reflect on the Creation and harmony of the universe in general, we are lost in wonder and amazement, and are unable to form a Just Idea of (that) strengh strength or power which is infinite.

And With respect to solidity and subtileness, our Ideas are also comparative: nor are we possessed of any criterian or standard whereby to ascertain what is absolutely solid solid or subtile. Every of the specific sorts of Wood we denominate to be solid, though (some) sorts are more solid than others. Mallable bodies of various densities are also denominated solid, though it is manifest that some of them are (more) solid than others, but these are comparative Ideas and do not give us an Idea of solidity in the abst

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nor do we know that there is any such thing in nature. Hard and ponderous bodies which to us appear to be smooth, and on which we bestow the term and attribute of solid, will appear to be rough, uneven and full of coarse pores when inspected through the medium of certain glasses, and (the) our beautif ladies who appear exquisitly beautiful to the eye, will have their (defects) deformity when surveyed through such mediums. illegible

The notions that have commonly been received of entity, is that which is general ly apprehended of solidity. Solidity is thought to exclud a vacuum, and consequently to constitute entity, but if the doctrine of solidity is closely attended to, we shall find as we have before observed, that we h(a)ve no conception of it, nor of any premised entity which may have been predicated thereon. Such specific sort of beings (things) as we can have a conception of through the medium of our senses, we are certain has an existence, but for us to found our notions of entity on the vulgar apprehensions of solidity, of which our senses and Ideas are incompitant to understand, or form any just conception, is to amuse ourselves with visionary apprehensions of things, that have no other existence (as we know of) but in our fertile imagination.

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