72

136

then, that we do go on some assumption of
equal possibility. Still, such an assumption
ought to be made on some consistent principle.
Even if we are to assume some things to be equally possible
I continue to object to assuming that
all the different probabilities of an event
are equally possible, because that proceeds
on no principle that is consistent with itself.
For there is no reason in assuming that the
different probabilities of one event are
equally possible rather than those of any
other event. The distinction between a simple
and a compound event is not a distinction
of fact, nor a distinction having
any basis whatever in objective fact.
We assume any events we like to be simple

136

then, that we do go on some assumption of
equal possibility. Still, such an assumption
ought to be made on some consistent principle.
Even if we are to assume some things to be equally possible
I continue to object to assuming that
all the different probabilities of an event
are equally possible, because that proceeds
on no principle that is consistent with itself.
For there is no reason in assuming that the
differeent probabilities of one event are
equally possible rather than those of any
other event. The distinction between a simple
and a compound event is not a distinction
of fact, nor a distinction having
any basis whatever in objective fact.
We assume any events we like to be simple